Women\u27s Rights as Human Rights - Rules, Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform by Hernández-Truyol, Berta E.
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1996
Women's Rights as Human Rights - Rules, Realities
and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform
Berta E. Hernández-Truyol
University of Florida Levin College of Law, hernandez@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Women Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Berta E. Hernández-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights - Rules, Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 Brook. J.
Int'l L. 605 (1996), available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/511
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS -
RULES, REALITIES AND THE ROLE OF
CULTURE: A FORMULA FOR REFORM
Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyor
From the first dawn of life unto the grave,
Poor womankind's in every state a slave.
We will our rights in learning's world maintain;
Wilt's empire now shall know a female reign.*
Beijing, China. Tuesday, September 5, 1995. Beijing
International Conference Center (BICC). The afternoon ple-
nary of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on
Women: Equality, Peace, Development is about to start in a
hall too small to seat everyone who wants to be there. Other
than places for some of the delegates from each attending
State, space is limited and in high demand. A lucky few lined
up for hours to get a ticket; many ended up negotiating prime
space in front of one of several TV screens strategically locat-
ed throughout the building. A hushed silence fell in the hall
and in the areas surrounding the TV screens. The introduc-
tion: Hillary Rodham Clinton, First Lady of the United States
of America. She speaks on women, children, poverty, educa-
tion, health, and economic and political participation. She
gets into a rhythm as she softly makes her point: "If there is
one message that echoes forth from this conference, it is that
human rights are women's rights-And women's rights are
human rights." Emphasizing her message, she gives detailed
examples--"it is a violation of human rights when babies are
denied food, or drowned, or suffocated, or their spines broken,
simply because they are born girls." She continues - "it is a
violation of human rights" when women and girls are subject
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. Many thanks to my
wonderful research assistants, Alison N. Stewart (St. John's Law '96) and Jennifer
Foley (St. John's Law '97), who provided invaluable assistance in the preparation
of this article. The Faculty Research Program of St. John's University School of
Law provided support for this work.
** Sarah Egerton, The Emulation (1703), quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF QUOTATIONS 267 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992).
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to: violence, even in their own homes; female genital mutila-
tion; bride-burning; girl-killing; rape, sometimes as a tactic or
prize of war; forced abortion; forced sterilization and the
usual litany of abuses that are, regrettably, all too common
and all too well known. The silence is broken, first by ner-
vous and gradually empowered applause which fills the
building-inside and outside the hall.-
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine, as we go into the 21st century, needing support
for such a simple statement: that over half of the world, mean-
ing women, are indeed humans and have human rights. This
apparently revolutionary concept has resulted in a powerful,
emerging movement in the international human rights arena
which urges the recognition and acknowledgement of women's
rights as human rights. This movement was clearly embraced
by First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton (and many other world
leaders) in China in September 1995, with her declaration that
"human rights are women's rights .... [aind women's rights
are human rights."' The catalysts at the core of this global
initiative to recognize and promote women's rights as human
rights are the correlative needs to eradicate the institutional-
ized invisibility of women in the global sphere, to craft a
means to implement existing rights to benefit women's lives,
and to develop, expand, and transform the content and mean-
ing of such rights to reflect women's realities and compel
women's equality. This article explores the roles played by
rules of law and by the conflation of economic, social, political,
religious, cultural, and historic realities in the marginalization
of women in the international, regional, and domestic spheres
worldwide.2 Its centerpiece is a proposed analytical model
*** See First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks to the United Nations
Fourth World Conference on Women Plenary Session 6-7 (Sept. 5-6, 1995) (copy on
file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Fourth World
Conference on Women].
1. Id. at 7. Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway also empha-
sized the importance of recognizing women's human rights and bettering women's
condition world-wide. Significantly, the United Nations Fourth World Conference on
Women, Beijing Declaration and Draft Platform for Action, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.177/20 (1995) (advance unedited draft) [hereinafter Beijing Platform],
clearly states women's rights are human rights. Id. % 14.
2. This exclusion of women has been a reality in both the public and private
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deconstructing and reconfiguring the human rights framework
to ensure that women's rights that exist in theory become
reality.
The United Nations Human Development Report 1995
states the shocking, but all-too-well known fact quite plainly:
"In no society today do women enjoy the same opportunities as
men." Recognizing the second-class status of women in societ-
ies around the world and the dangers of the marginalization
that results, this article, as the title suggests, reviews and
analyzes the rules that exist and the realities that persist. It
proposes reform in the context of cultural, religious, and tradi-
tional norms and practices. Part II describes the general set-
ting that provided the impetus for women around the world to
unite and demand their rights as human beings. Part III re-
views the international human rights construct to establish
that, as a matter of paper rights, women are, or should be,
protected under existing norms. Part IV reveals that the reali-
ty of the conditions and status of women worldwide is a far cry
from the equality mandated by the rules. This section includes
an assessment of some gender-specific practices, some of which
are justified by culture, history, and tradition, as well as a
scrutiny of various substantive provisions of the body of human
rights documents to show that women are, indeed, not equal in
their enjoyment of, or protection by, established international
spheres. See infra notes 4-6, 145-57 and accompanying text; see also FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY FOUNDATIONS 3 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) [hereinafter FOUNDA-
TIONS]. "[Tihe role of law, which by its absence and unwillingness to regulate the
domestic sphere, implicitly has ensured constraints that have relegated women to
the private sphere. In this manner law plays a powerful role in shaping and
maintaining women's subordination." Id.; see also Karen Knop, Re/Statements:
Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 293 (1993); Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International Human
Rights Law: The Way Forward, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 230, 234 (1993). See generally
Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of
Law, in FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 9; UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995, at 1 (1995) (hereinafter UNIIDR 1995] ("One
of the defining movements of the 20th century has been the relentless struggle for
gender equality.").
3. UNHDR 1995, supra note 2, at 29. This report recognizes that "a wide-
spread pattern of inequality between women and men-in their access to educa-
tion, health and nutrition, and even more in their participation in the economic
and political sphere." Id. "The reality ... is that women do not share equally
with men in the opportunities, benefits and responsibilities of citizenship and de-
velopment." Id. at 99.
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norms. In Part V, this piece explores the role of culture in
analyzing the nature and obligations of compliance with articu-
lated human rights. Finally, Part VI designs a methodology
that reconstructs the existing approach to rights to ensure,
facilitate, and safeguard women's enjoyment of the full range
of human rights.
To be sure, the analytical methodology proposed is not
necessarily limited to a scrutiny of gender issues. Indeed, it
cannot be limited to gender because gender is not, and cannot
be, a monolithic category. Gender cannot be considered essen-
tial or viewed in isolation. Women's personhood is also indivisi-
ble from racial, ethnic, cultural, and other aspects of their
identity.4 Women speak in different tongues and experience
life in different ways. It is, thus, with a multiple perspective or
multidimensionality analysis that this article addresses
women's rights as human rights.
II. THE GLOBAL SETTING
Notwithstanding roadblocks in law and life, women have
refused to accept, and indeed have fought strongly against,
their imposed invisibility and silence. Throughout time, women
have made unrelenting efforts to raise their voices, urge their
perspectives, and demand that their needs be met. Women
have been at the forefront of this human rights drive, present-
ing their separate realities and insisting that issues affecting
them because of their sex be deemed an integral part of the
human rights construct.
The traditional exclusion of women from the articulation,
development, implementation, and enforcement of human
rights has rendered gender issues invisible, and consequently
has shielded gender-based abuses from much needed scrutiny.
For example, the flawed public/private dichotomy historically
interfered with the recognition of wrongs inflicted on women
because of their sex such as domestic violence, which now is
acknowledged as a violation of domestic, regional, and interna-
tional rights,5 including, among others, the right to security of
4. Certainly, that perspective is personal-I can no more check my ethnicity
at the coat room as I write this article than I can check my gender.
5. For the negative impact of the public/private dichotomy on women's exer-
cise of human rights, see Donna Sullivan, The Public/Private Distinction in Inter-
national Human Rights Law, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
[Vol. MX:3608
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the person.' This false public/private dichotomy, in the name
of the "rule of law," has ghettoized women's interests and con-
spired to deny equal status to women.
The exclusion of women from the enjoyment of human
rights exists in all three of the so-called generations of human
rights - first (civil and political), second (economic, social, and
cultural), and third (solidarity).' Thus, international norms
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 126 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) [hereinafter
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES]; Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A Fem-
inist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law,
in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 85
(Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN]; Hilary
Charlesworth, The Public/Private Distinction and the Right to Development in
International Law, 12 AUSTL. YJ3. INTL L. 190 (1992); Julie Mertus, State Dis-
criminatory Family Law and Customary Abuses, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra,
at 135. For United States cases discussing the battering of women in the context
of the public/private distinction, see BEVERLY BALOS & MARY L. FELLOWS, LAW
AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: CASES AND MATERIALS ON SYSTEMS OF OPPRES-
SION 195-200 (1994).
Since the emergence of women's activism in the international sphere, vari-
ous international documents have addressed the public/private dichotomy. See Vien-
na Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts.,
48th Sess., pt. If, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action]; Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on the Status of Women, Annex 1, art.
2(a)-(b), U.N. Doc. EICN.61WG.2/19921L.3 (1993) [hereinafter DEVAW].
6. Human rights violations against women frequently go unacknowledged and
unpunished simply because private persons, rather than state agents, are the ac-
tors. The right to security of the person is one such right often breached, particu-
larly in instances of domestic violence. For documents recognizing the right to
security of the person, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 3, U.N. Doe. A1810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Decla-
ration]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, art. 9(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 [hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art.
5(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 226, amended by Protocol No. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 46, Proto-
col No. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 45, Protocol No. 5, Europ. T.S. No. 55, Protocol No. 8,
Europ. T.S. No. 118 [hereinafter European Convention]; Report of the International
Conference on Population and Development, International Conf. on Population and
Dev., ch. II, princ. 1, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994) [hereinafter ICPD];
Report of the World Summit for Social Development, Principles and Goals 26(1), at
10, U.N. Doc A/CONF.166/9 (1995) [hereinafter CDPOA]; Beijing Platform, supra
note 1, 14.
7. For a description of the evolution of the generational rights, see Louis B.
Sobn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
Than States, 32 AMl. U. L. REV. 1 (1982); Fernando R. Tes6n, International Human
Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 869 (1985) (citing Philip Alston,
A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of
International Human Rights Law?, 29 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 307, 321 (1982)); see
also Susana Fried, Panel Session on Economic and Social Rights (June 1994) (pa-
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must be reconceptualized to reach issues that concern individu-
als such as sexual harassment, gender-based violence, repro-
ductive freedom, education, and the right to vote, as well as
issues that pertain to states, governments, and intergovern-
mental organizations, such as economic policies and structural
adjustment programs. The incorporation of the multiplicity of
women's voices and concerns into the rights discourse is essen-
tial to effect this reformulation of rights. Scholars, representa-
tives (at the national, international, intergovernmental, and
non-governmental levels), and activists in various fields must
work together, utilizing an interdisciplinary approach to the
rights construct, to implement existing rights in a fashion that
includes and protects women. Only such an approach will de-
velop, expand, and transform the content and meaning of hu-
man rights in a manner that will reflect women's realities and
include women's diverse perspectives.8
The proposed analytical model takes a necessary, and
appropriate, multidimensional perspective.' The current con-
per given at the Women's Global Leadership Institute, Center for Women's Global
Leadership) (arguing that hierarchy implied by notion of "generations" of rights ob-
structs recognition of indivisibility and intersectionality of human rights in general,
and women's rights in particular).
8. See Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol, Report of the Conference Rapporteur, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 1389 (1995) (Author proposes multidimensionality approach to
evaluate claims, rather than the prevalent, traditional single-issue approach, and
notes that in international arena, increasing activism of nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) has secured greater participation by women in human rights dis-
course. As a result, recent international documents such as the Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action reflect more adequately women's concerns and their per-
spectives.); see also Gwendolyn Mikell, African Structural Adjustment: Women and
Legal Changes, 69 ST. JOHN's L. REV. (forthcoming 1996); Claudio Grossman, The
Inter-American System: Opportunities For Women's Rights, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1305
(1995); ICPD, supra note 6, at ch. XV.
9. See Herndndez-Truyol, supra note 8. See infra Part VI, for the author's
proposal of a woman-centered multidimensional perspective which addresses racial,
ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious, nationality, socioeconomic class, and sexuality
issues, recognizing that gender cannot be isolated from any of these categories. See
also Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 11, 12 ("Gender must also be analyzed in
relation to other factors such as nationality, race, and class in order to discuss the
multiple forms of human rights abuse that women suffer."); Berta E. Herndndez-
Truyol, Building Bridges - Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhet-
oric and Replacement, 25 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1994) [hereinafter
Herndndez-Truyol, Building Bridges] (proposing multidimensional perspective in
dealing with Latinas/os as a non-monolithic ethnic group); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, in FOUNDA-
610
19961 FORMULA FOR REFORM 611
struct which defmes rights and prohibitions with a single-issue
focus is ill-equipped as an analytical tool to evaluate diverse
and indivisible women's issues.' ° Further, the multidimen-
sional perspective incorporates a culturally sensitive analysis
that embraces the realities and voices of women from different
cultures, religions and traditions to ensure that the new inter-
national human rights construct is indeed egalitarian in both
principle and application.
Although these concerns and issues are not new, it is only
now that women have gained access to domestic and interna-
tional arenas-both formal and informal-that the gender
dimensions of human rights norms are being explored and that
a feminist critique of international law is emerging." Despite
TIONS, supra note 2, at 383 (discussing "problematic consequence[s] of the tendency
to treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analy-
sis."); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (criticizing notion that "unitary, 'essential' women's experi-
ence can be . . . described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and
other realities of experience"); Celina Romany, Ain't I a Feminist?, 4 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 23, 24 (1991) ("The feminism . .. which I want to recover in the con-
text of legal theory is that which redefines subjectivity in light of the key vari-
ables of subject formation: race, ethnicity, class and gender."). But see Catharine A.
MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE
JL. & FEMINISM 13, 18 (1991) ("In recent critiques of feminist work for failing to
take account of race or class, it is worth noting that the fact that there is such a
thing as race and class is assumed, although race and class are generally treated
as abstractions to attack gender rather than as concrete realities, if indeed they
are treated at all.") (citations omitted).
10. See Hernndez-Truyol, supra note 8 (noting that human rights discourse
must recognize womens roles outside traditional purview including their rights to
participate in all aspects of public and private life); see also Lucinda Finley,
Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal
Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 887 (1989) (questioning whether law,
framed and defined by men, can adequately address "women's experiences of
harm"); Marfa C. Lugones et al., Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory,
Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for 'The Woman's Voice', 6 WOMEN'S STUD.
INT'L F. 573, 573-76 (1983).
11. The Vienna Conference addressed and incorporated womens concerns into
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. See Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, supra note 5. See also Elisabeth Friedman, Women's Human
Rights: The Emergence of a Movement, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at
18, 30 (commenting that "the most organized and vocal of the NGO participants
[at Vienna were] women [promoting] . . . their issues at the NGO Forum and the
official meeting"); Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International
Law, 85 AM. J. INTL L. 613 (1991) (Feminist critique of international human
rights reaffirms need to reassess and reconstruct traditional paradigm to reflect
women's realities); Mona Zulficar, From Human Rights to Program Reality: Vienna,
Cairo, and Beijing in Perspective, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1995) ("The [Vi-
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the infancy of this "women's rights are human rights" move-
ment, there are some who have already begun to dispute the
need for any focus on international women's human rights.
These critics suggest that such discourse is inappropriate and
unnecessary because international human rights norms include
women as human beings, and sex, meaning female, as a pro-
tected class. Thus, the proper emphasis is on all people, not
just women.12 Predictably, critics of the feminist methodology
take the formalistic, simplistic approach that a focus on
women's human rights is misplaced because international,13
regional, 4 and domestic 5 instruments facially mandate gen-
der equality.
This analysis is defective for various reasons, not the least
of which is that it would be inconceivable to challenge a con-
cern about the rights of people belonging to a racial, religious
or indigenous group on the grounds that they are simply peo-
ple too. 6 Further, such criticisms are problematic as a "reali-
ty check" on women's everyday lives empirically and reveal the
historic invisibility and silencing of women in the rights dis-
course and the present global status and condition of women as
second-class citizens.
Focusing on women's rights as human rights in the inter-
national forum is not only proper but also imperative. The
enna Conference] provided women's groups and nongovernmental organizations [1
with an excellent platform for advocating the integration of women's rights as
human rights into the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.").
12. See, e.g., Fernando R. Tes6n, Feminism and International Law: A Reply,
33 VA. J. INT'L L. 647 (1993). But see Bunch, supra note 9.
13. See infra notes 35-36, 38-41, for discussion of international documents.
14. See infra notes 42-45, for discussion of regional documents.
15. For a sample of domestic instruments expressly including sex equality, see
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC POLICY: AN INTERNATIONAL COLLECTION OF TEXTS COVERING 450
COUNTRIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL UNITS (1944) (enumerating constitutional
provisions guaranteeing civil rights based on equality of various nations, including
Austria, Paraguay, Romania, Nicaragua, Cuba, and the United States).
16. This analysis fails to accommodate the position of women as political mi-
norities within a system dominated by decidedly patriarchal institutions and incli-
nations. It also does not take into consideration the fact that many international
law documents expressly exclude or routinely ignore women. See infra notes 147-59
and accompanying text (detailing how international law documents either expressly
exclude or routinely ignore women). See also Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Cri-
tiques of International Law and Their Critics (response to Tes6n critique delivered
at American Association of Law Schools 1994 Annual Meeting, International Law
Section, on file with author).
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breadth and depth of issues pertinent to women's human
rights reflect existing problems in the world at large. Gender is
a particularly well-suited point of reference for the reconstruc-
tion of the flawed, monocular scheme precisely because it en-
compasses vital and often ignored issues of race, ethnicity,
nationality, culture, language, color, religion, ability (physical
and mental), socioeconomic class, and sexuality.
Another reason to concentrate on gender is that it affords
a sharp focus within the macrocosm of international law. Vir-
tually every society-and its structural, political, social, cultur-
al, and religious systems-evidences some form of gender dis-
crimination or subjugation.' Sex inequality is a global reality.
Indeed, its prevalence gives female subordination and
marginalization the appearance not only of inevitability but
also of normativity.'5
Significantly, a woman-centered analysis will prevent
those in the United States, as well as in other western States,
from considering gender problems and concerns as existing
only in "other places" such as Third World states, or states
with non-western-based traditions, perspectives and outlooks.
One example of the universality of sex inequality is the femini-
zation of poverty-a global reality that neither can be ignored
nor disputed. 9 Other factors that freely interact to perpetuate
17. See Bunch, supra note 9, at 11-17; Friedman, supra note 11, at 18-35. See
generally UNHDR 1995, supra note 2.
18. See generally UNHDR 1995, supra note 2.
19. See MARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERI-
OUSLY, CASES AND MATERIALS 511 n.3 (1994). A United States census report com-
paring the incidence of poverty across gender and racial lines indicated that "only
4% of elderly white married women are poor, whereas 24% of elderly white women
living alone are poor. Of African American women, 22% of older married women
are poor, whereas 60% of older Black women living alone are poor." Id. Further,
in exploring the socioeconomic basis for this discrepancy, the authors note that
women are typically paid less for their services and are less likely to remain in
the labor market where pension benefits are often tied to lifetime earnings. Id.
Moreover, the gender inequity evident in poverty rates provide "the strongest evi-
dence that safety nets protect men better than women (and children). In the Unit-
ed States, (two out of three adults in poverty are women; three-quarters of the
nation's poor are women and children; 50% of female-headed households-and 75%
of homes headed by black women-live below the poverty line; three-quarters of
the elderly poor are women.'" Id. at 889 (citing DIANE BALSER, SISTERHOOD &
SOLIDARITY: FEMINISM AND LABOR IN MODERN TIMES 17 (1987)). See also Mikell,
supra note 8 (noting disproportionate adverse effects on women of economic and
structural adjustment); CDPOA, supra note 6, commitment 2(b); UNDHR 1995,
supra note 2 (women represent 70% of all persons in poverty).
1996] 613
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gender subordination and disparity are persistent discrimina-
tory employment practices, inequitable social-structural rela-
tionships, and gender-based violence-daily facts of life for
women. The concept of "women as wombs" is also a pervasive
worldwide phenomenon and is central to the universal failure
to recognize the plethora of issues attendant to women's
health, which include, but are not limited to, bearing children.
Most important, the concept of women's health must be rede-
fined beyond "sick" or "medicalized" needs to include matters of
well-being such as education (schooling, in general and health,
including reproductive issues, in particular), economic self
determination, political participation, environmental safety,
and personal security, to name a few.
Issues relating to reproductive freedoms highlight the
critical importance of approaching rights as indivisible and
reveal the weakness of the normative single-right approach as
under-inclusive." It lends itself to a critique from a feminist
perspective,2' from a cross-cultural perspective, including con-
siderations of race, ethnicity, and religion,22 as well as from a
20. See Fitnat Naa-Adjeley Adjetey, Reclaiming the African Woman's Individu-
ality: The Struggle Between Women's Reproductive Autonomy and African Society
and Culture, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1351 (1995); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, State
Responsibility Under International Human Rights Law to Change Religious and
Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 5, at 167; Zulficar,
supra note 11, at 1017; Rebecca J. Cook, Human Rights and Reproductive Self-
Determination, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 975 (1995) (noting that a single-right perspective
has not led to fully satisfactory approaches or results and suggesting a clustering
of rights perspective); Reed Boland, Civil and Political Rights and the Right to
Nondiscrimination: Population Policies, Human Rights, and Legal Change, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 1257, 1263-64 (1995) (commenting that ICCPR guarantees protection of
certain reproductive rights when accurately contextualized); REBECCA J. COOK,
WOMEN'S HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF
WOMEN'S HEALTH THROUGH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 16, 23-36 (1994)
[hereinafter WOMEN'S HEALTH] (discussing reproductive protections afforded by
ICCPR).
21. See Cook, supra note 20; see also Mahmoud Fathalla, The Impact of Re-
productive Subordination on Women's Health: Family Planning Services, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 1179 (1995) (focusing on women's powerlessness as a serious health haz-
ard); Berta E. Herngndez, To Bear Or Not To Bear: Reproductive Freedom as an
International Human Right, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309 (1991).
22. For a discussion of the intersection of rights and religion, see Sajeda Amin
& Sara Hossain, Women's Reproductive Rights and the Politics of Fundamentalism:
A View From Bangladesh, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1319 (1995) (Muslim fundamental-
ism); Frances Kissling, The Challenge of Christianity, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1345
(1995) (Christianity); Donna J. Sullivan, Resolving Conflicting Human Rights Stan-
dards in International Law, 85 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 344, 344-49 (1991). For a dis-
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wide, we must discipline ourselves to see global concerns from
myriad perspectives including not only gender, but also the in-
tersection of gender with, and the indivisibility of gender from,
race, ethnicity, nationality, culture, language, color, religion,
physical and mental ability, socio-economic class, and sexuali-
ty.
It is in this context that this article addresses the notions
of international women's human rights. Although women's in-
volvement in this arena is a relative novelty, the success of
women already can be felt. The impact of women's voices and
perspectives is evident in the changes made concerning repro-
ductive freedom issues,' issues of domestic violence,29 and
issues of gender-based violence in times of armed conflict. 0
28. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 5, pt. 2, 91
38 ("Violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict are
violations of the flndamental principles of international human rights and humani-
tarian law. All violations of this kind, including in particular murder, systematic
rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, require a particularly effective re-
sponse."); ICPD, supra note 6, ch. 11, princ. 8 ("States should take all appropriate
measures to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, universal access to
health-care services, including those related to reproductive health care, which
includes family planning and sexual health."); Id. princ. 4, chs. 4, 6-8, 11, 12;
CDPOA, supra note 6, 91 36(h) (government should make "[aiccessible through the
primary health-care system reproductive health to all individuals of appropriate
ages"); Id. q 73(c) ("Taking specific measures . . . to remove long-standing legal
and social barriers to employment, education, productive resources and public ser-
vices; assist women in becoming aware of and realizing their rights; and to ensure
the elimination of intra-family discrimination for the girl child, especially in regard
to health, nutrition and education . . . ."); Beijing Platform, supra note 1, % 94
("The prevalence among women of... [the limited power many women have over
their sexual and reproductive lives] and lack of influence in decision-making are
social realities which have an adverse impact on their health .... Good health is
essential to leading a productive and filfilling life [and the right of all women to
control their own fertility is basic to their empowerment.]"). See generally id. 99
91-112, 123, 132, 136, 144(d), 216, 223, 232(f) (discussing limitations on women's
reproductive freedom and suggesting remedies).
29. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic
Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291 (1994); Katharine M.
Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women's Right to State Protection From
Domestic Violence in the Americas, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507, 507-61 (1993).
30. See Rhonda Copelon, Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape in
Time of War, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 197. Rhonda Copelon
stated that "the issue of the rape of women in Bosnia became part of the broader
global feminist effort, less influenced by nationalist diplomacies, at the same time
that it advanced the feminist campaign by underscoring the gravity of ongoing
gender violence just two hundred miles from the conference site." Id. at 198; 2
LEON FRIEDAN, THE LAW OF WAR, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 46 (1972); MASS
RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (Alexandra Stiglmayer
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ensure women's visibility in the global sphere at all lev-
els-locally, statewide, and internationally. These efforts sig-
nificantly have transformed the concept of women's rights as
human rights.
The formal notion that sex equality is central to human
rights dates to 1945 when the United Nations Charter (U.N.
Charter), among other things, "reaffirm[ed] ... the equal
rights of men and women 35 and stated as one of its purposes
the achievement of international cooperation "in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms..., without distinction as to... sex... ."" In February
1946, after the U.N. Charter's adoption, the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) created the Commission on Human
Rights (UNCHR).37 The UNCHR's agenda was embodied in a
body of human rights documents that constitute the foundation
of international human rights norms: the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights38 (Declaration or Universal Declara-
tion), adopted in 1948, and two international covenants that
were adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976-the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights39(ICCPR)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
35. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
36. Id. art. 1(3). The U.N. Charter expressly provides in Article 1 that one of
its stated purposes is '[t]o achieve international cooperation in solving internation-
al problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion . . . ." Id.
37. The Human Rights Commission was established by ECOSOC pursuant to
the U.N. Charter which reads, in part: "1. The Economic and Social Council may
make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social,
cultural, educational, health, and related matters .... 2. It may make recommen-
dations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all." U.N. CHARTER art. 62(1)-(2). It is presently
composed of forty-three Member States elected for three-year terms. The Commis-
sion is responsible for making studies, preparing recommendations and drafting
documents relating to human rights. See also FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID
WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 5-6
(1990); 6 ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, FRONTIERS OF ANTHROPOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 24 (1990).
38. See supra note 6.
39. Supra note 6.
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The work continues on issues of work, education, and self-de-
termination.
III. THE RULES
Initially, women achieved global visibility not within the
formal international system itself, but by creating an informal
track running parallel to the formal system. This parallel track
was necessary because women were excluded from all aspects
and levels of official international structures and policy-mak-
ing. Grass roots activism by individual women and through the
work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) created a
bridge to the formalistic/traditional international framework.
This parallel system met with unprecedented success, as evi-
denced in Rio,31 Vienna,32 Cairo,3 and Beijing.34 Such ac-
tions initiated the reconstitution of the rights construct to meet
women's real needs, effect women's self-determination, and
ed. & Marion Farber trans., 1994).
31. Adoption of Agreements on Environment and Development, The Rio Decla-
ration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conf. on Environment and Develop-
ment, Annex, Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/Rev. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration]; Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151126 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
32. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 5. See
Zulficar, supra note 11, at 1035 ('Vienna and Cairo stand as milestones on the
road to women's empowerment and enjoyment of their full human rights."); Bunch,
supra note 9, at 17 (noting how many women's issues were placed "squarely on
the world's doorstep" by the Vienna Conference).
33. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; CDPOA, supra note 6, 7,
70, 82; see also DEVAW, supra note 5, arts. 4(o)-9, 5. See generally, ICPD, supra
note 6, 14.8, on the role and participation of NGO's in the international human
rights sphere.
34. Fourth World Conference on Women, supra note 1. Even before the official
closing of the conference and the finalizing of the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, the developments achieved at this meeting were deemed to
be a great success on key issues of equality for women including the reiteration of
women's right to decide freely on matters pertaining to their sexuality and child
bearing; the condemnation of forced sterilizations and forced abortions; the agree-
ment that systematic rape in war is a crime and perpetrators are war criminals,
that domestic violence is a worldwide problem and governments must intervene,
and that female genital mutilation (FGM), dowry-based violence, domestic battery
and sexual harassment at work are human rights violations; the recognition of
global discrimination against girls, and that access to credit is central to women's
empowerment; and the acceptance that governments should guarantee women
equal rights to inherit (although not equal inheritance). Patrick E. Tyler, Forum
on Women Agrees on Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1995, at Al, A3.
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tural Rights4" (Economic Covenant). Significantly, all three of
these instruments expressly provide for sex equality.4
It is important to point out that various other instruments,
some substantive in perspective and some regional in scope,
have expanded and strengthened this human rights founda-
40. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter Eco-
nomic Covenant]. For a discussion of how the rights contained in the Economic
Covenant can be developed, expanded and transformed to protect women's rights,
in particular reproductive and sexual health rights, see Aart Hendriks, Promotion
and Protection of Women's Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health Under Interna-
tional Law: The Economic Covenant and The Women's Convention, 44 AA1. U. L.
REV. 1123 (1995); Audrey R. Chapman, Monitoring Women's Right to Health Under
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 1157 (1995); WOMEN'S HEALTH, supra note 20, at 30-33, 36, 40-41.
41. The Universal Declaration clearly provides that "[e]veryone is entitled to
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nation-
al or social origin, property, birth, or other status." Universal Declaration, supra
note 6, art. 2 (emphasis added). The ICCPR provides that:
[e]ach state party to the present Covenant, undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173 (emphasis added). In addition,
the ICCPR, in articulating the rights of individuals, provides that:
[all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any dis-
crimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
Id. art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Economic Covenant provides that "[t]he States Parties to the
present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present
Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status." Economic Covenant, supra note 40, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S.
at 5 (emphasis added). In addition, the Economic Covenant provides that "the
States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men
and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth
in the present Covenant." Id. art. 3, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5 (emphasis added). More-
over, in addressing the State Parties' obligation to recognize the right of everyone
to just and favorable conditions of work, the Covenant specifically obligates States
Parties to ensure "(a) remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum,
with: (i) fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without dis-
tinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not
inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work ... " Id. art. 7
(a)(i), 993 U.N.T.S. at 6 (emphasis added).
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tion. For example, three regional instruments aimed at the
protection of human rights-the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms42
(European Convention), the American Convention on Human
Rights" (American Convention), and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights44 (African Charter)-all expressly
provide for sex equality.45
42. European Convention, supra note 6. See Hern~ndez, supra note 21, at 325-
44 (discussing evolution and expansion of reproductive rights by treaties, custom,
and judicial decisions).
43. American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,"
adopted Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [here-
inafter American Convention]. Claudio Grossman addresses the use of regional
systems, in particular the Inter-American system, to protect reproductive and sexu-
al health rights and freedoms. See Grossman, supra note 8, at 1305. In particular,
Dean Grossman suggests that the new democratic environment in the region, with
every government (except Cuba's) being democratically elected, indicates there is
an evolving entitlement to democracy that should be used to further reproductive
and sexual health rights and freedoms. ie also suggests that no true democracy
can exist without a recognition of women's rights including reproductive and sexu-
al health rights and freedoms. Further, he explains that the Inter-American sys-
tem can further women's rights in general, and reproductive and sexual health
rights in particular, because it imposes a duty upon the states to protect rights
and because a victim or anyone on the victim's behalf can file a petition for re-
dress of rights. Id. For the ground-breaking work discussing the emergency right
of democracy, see THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AtONG NATIONS
(1990); Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM1. J.
INT'L. L. 46 (1992) [hereinafter Franck, The Emerging Right]. See also HernAndez,
supra note 21, at 325-44.
44. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. CABJLEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1981), reprinted in 21 IL.M. 58 (1982) (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter]; see also Adjetey, supra note
20 (discussing use of African Charter to protect and further reproductive and sexu-
al health rights and freedoms).
45. The European Convention provides that "[tlhe enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any grounds such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth, or
other status." European Convention, supra note 6, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
Similarly, the American Convention provides that:
[t]he States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights
and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to
their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms,
without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status,
birth, or any other social condition.
American Convention, supra note 43, art. 1, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 145. Moreover, the
African Charter provides that "[elvery individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment
of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter with-
out distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, reli-
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In addition, two classification-specific instruments, one
focusing on race-the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination46 (Race Conven-
tion), and the other on sex-the Convention of the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination against -Women47 (Women's
Convention)-also expressly mandate gender equality. In fact,
the Women's Convention throughout expressly articulates the
goal of establishing equality for women in all spheres, ranging
from the public to the private, including .health,4" educa-
tion,49 and political participation," among many others.5'
gion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or
other status." African Charter, supra note 44, art. 2, 21 IL.M. at 60.
46. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into
force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Race Convention]. The Convention notes as its
purpose "the achievement of one of the purposes of United Nations which is to
promote and encourage universal respect for an observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or reli-
gion ... ." Id. pmbl., 660 U.N.T.S. at 212-13.
47. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter Women's Convention]. In its preamble, the Women's
Convention notes the purpose of the U.N. Charter, Universal Declaration, and both
the ICCPR and Economic Covenant as obligating states to ensure equality on the
basis of sex. See Id. pmbl., 1249 U.N.T.S. at 14-16; WOMEN'S HEALTH, supra note
20, at 19-43 (discussing reproductive rights and Women's Convention); see also
Carlota Bustelo, Reproductive Health and CEDAW, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1145 (1995).
48. Women's Convention, supra note 47, art. 11(1)(f), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 18
("The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including
the safeguarding of the function of reproduction."). Article 12 states that:
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure,
on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services,
including those related to family planning.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 above of this article,
States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection
with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free
services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy
and lactation.
Id. art. 12, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 19; Id. art. 14(2)(b), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 19 ("women in
rural areas . . . [have a right to] .. . access to adequate health care facilities,
including information, counselling and services in family planning").
49. Id. art. 10, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17-18 ("States Parties shall take all appro-
priate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure
them equal rights with men in the field of education . .. ."); Id. art. 14(2)(d),
1249 U.N.T.S. at 19 ("women in rural areas [have a right to] . . . obtain all types
of training and education, formal and non-formal, including that relating to func-
tional literacy, as well as, inter alia, the benefit of all community and extension
services, in order to increase their technical proficiency").
50. Article 7 states that:
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Through activism, women have become a force in the discourse
about and development of international norms, and new mean-
ing has been brought to basic notions of sex equality and hu-
man rights.
For example, in the reproductive freedom area,52 women's
rights activists have transformed the concept of reproductive
rights from the narrow concept of women's health in maternity
and childbirth (which stereotypes "women as wombs"), to a
holistic view coalescing a great amalgam of rights includingfirst, second, and third generation human rights. 3 These gen-
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in the political and public life . . . [including
rights]
(a) To vote in all elections . . .
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the
implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public
functions at all levels of government;
(c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associa-
tions concerned with the public and political life of the country.
Id. art. 7, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17; Id. art. 8, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17 ("States Parties
shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal terms with men
and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their Governments at
the international level . . .")
51. Further, the Women's Convention guarantees the right to information,
opinion, and expression. Id. art. 10(e), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 18 (Women have the right
to "[tihe same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing education").
Women also have the right to health, id. art. 14(2)(b), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 19 (Wom-
en have right "[t]o have access to adequate health care facilities, including infor-
mation, counselling and services in family planning"), and to decide on family
composition, id. art. 16(1)(e), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20 (Women have the "rights to de-
cide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to
have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise
these rights"). The Women's Convention also guarantees the right to marry and
found a family, as well as the right to private and family life. Id. art. 16(a)-(b),
(d), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20 (Women have the right "to enter into marriage . . . freely
to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full con-
sent . . . same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital
status, in matters relating to their children . . . .).
52. For a discussion of reproductive freedom as an internationally protected
human right, see Hern~ndez, supra note 21; Cook, supra note 20, at 975-1016;
Rebecca J. Cook, International Protection of Women's Reproductive Rights, 24
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 645 (1992); Sylvia A. Law & Lisa F. Rackner, Gender
Equality and the Mexico City Policy, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 193, 193 n.1
(1987).
53. See WOMEN'S HEALTH, supra note 20, at 20; Sohn, supra note 7 (discuss-
ing development of generational rights in United Nations); Douglas L. Donoho,
Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for Meaningful Stan-
dards, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 345, 349 n.11 (1991) ("The so-called third generation!
of human rights are the result of efforts by some human rights advocates to pro-
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erations of rights are all promised by, and included in, the
documents that constitute the foundation of international hu-
man rights norms, i.e., the Universal Declaration,' 4 the
ICCPR, 6 and the Economic Covenant,"6 as well as various
other international, regional, and conference documents such
as the Women's Convention,57 the Race Convention," the
American Convention,59 the African Charter," the European
Convention,6 the Cairo Programme of Action,62 the Social
mote some 'collective' rights, such as the rights to development, a clean environ-
ment, and to humanitarian assistance."); Tes6n, supra note 7, at 871 n.14 ("The
advocacy of [third generation rights) may represent an attempt to use the favor-
able emotive connections of human rights language to expand the 'rights' of the
state at the expense of individual rights."); see also Fried, supra note 7, cf. Phillip
Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfus-
cation of International Human Rights Law?, 29 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 307 (1982)
(solidarity rights must not abridge existing rights). See generally Phillip Alston,
Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development, 1
HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 3 (1988).
54. For an example of a first generation right in the Universal Declaration,
see Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 8 (right to effective remedy by com-
petent national tribunal for acts violating fundamental rights guaranteed by consti-
tution or other law); Id. art. 27 (third generation right (right to participate in
cultural life of community)).
55. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175 (first gener-
ation right (liberty and security of person)); Id. art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178 (for
example of second generation right (freedom of religion)).
56. See, e.g., Economic Covenant, supra note 40, art. 10, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7
(first generation right (right to found a family)); Id. art. 15(1)(c), 993 U.N.T.S. at 9
(second generation right (right to benefits of scientific progress)); Id. art. 12, 993
U.N.T.S. at 8 (third generation right (right to highest attainable level of physical
and mental health)).
57. See, e.g., Women's Convention, supra note 47, art. 16(1)(a), 1249 U.N.T.S.
at 20 (first generation right (right to marry)); Id. art. 13(c), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 19
(third generation right (right to participate in all aspects of cultural life)).
58. See, e.g., Race Convention, supra note 46, art. 5(c), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220
(first generation right (right to vote)); Id. art. 5(e)(iv), 660 U.N.T.S. at 222 (third
generation right (right to health care services)).
59. See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 43, art. 23(1)(a), 1144 U.N.T.S.
at 151 (first generation right (right to take part in public affairs)); Id. art. 26,
1144 U.N.T.S. at 152 (second generation right (right to education)); Id. art. 26,
1144 U.N.T.S. at 152 (third generation right (right to health care)).
60. See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 44, art. 13(1), 21 I.L.M. at 61 (first
generation right (right to participate in government)); Id. art. 8, 21 I.L.M. at 60
(second generation right (freedom of religion)).
61. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 6, art. 11, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232
(first generation right (freedom of assembly)); Id. Protocol 1, art. 2 (second genera-
tion right (right to education)).
62. See, e.g., ICPD, supra note 6, princ. 9 (first generation right (right to
marry)); Id. princ. 10 (second generation right (right to education)); Id. princ. 3
(third generation right (right to development)).
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Summit Declaration and Programme of Action,6 and the
Beijing Platform for Action for the Fourth World Conference on
Women.64 These instruments provide for the protection of
rights to privacy,65 health,66 equality and non-discrimina-
tion,"7  education," religion,69  travel, 0  family life,"' deci-
63. See, e.g., CDPOA, supra note 6, commitment 4(c) (first generation right
(right to participate in politics)); Id. commitment 5(c) (second generation right
(right to education)); Id. commitment 5(d) (third generation right (right to health
care)).
64. See, e.g., Beijing Platform, supra note 1, ch. I (first generation right (right
to participate in policy-making processes)); Id. strat. obj. B(1) (second generation
right (right to equal access to education)); Id. strat. obj. C(1) (third generation
right (right to health care)).
65. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 12 ("No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with h[er] privacy . . . ."); ICCPR, supra note 6,
art. 17(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 177 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlaw-
ful interference with h[er] privacy ... ."). The Beijing Declaration and Programme
of Action reinforces the right of privacy by noting that women often do not fully
enjoy it, particularly with respect to matters of health. See, e.g., Beijing Platform,
supra note 1, 104 ("Women are frequently not treated with respect, nor are they
guaranteed privacy and confidentiality.. . ."); Id. 95, 108 (recognizing lack of
privacy in health matters for young girls and adolescents).
66. See, e.g., Women's Convention, supra note 47, art. 11(1)(f), 1249 U.N.T.S.
at 18 ("State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimina-
tion against women . . . to ensure . . . [t]he right to protection of health and to
safety in working conditions . . . ."); Id. art. 12(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 19 ("State
Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of
men and women, access to health care services . . . ."); African Charter, supra
note 44, art. 16(1), 21 I.L.M. at 61 ("Every individual shall have the right to enjoy
the best attainable state of physical and mental health."). 91 of the Beijing
Platform states that:
Women have the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable stan-
dard of physical and mental health. The enjoyment of this right is vital
to their life and well-being and their ability to participate in all areas of
public and private life. Health is a state of complete physical, mental
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
Women's health involves their emotional, social and physical well-being
and is determined by the social, political and economic context of their
lives, as well as by biology. However, health and well-being elude the
majority of women. [The major] barrier for women to the achievement of
the highest attainable standard of health is inequality, both between men
and women and [among women]. In national and international forums,
women have emphasized that to attain optimal health throughout the life
cycle, equality, including the sharing of family responsibilities, develop-
ment and peace are necessary conditions.
Beijing Platform, supra note 1, q 91; Id. ch. IV., sec. C (on women's health).
67. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 1 ("All human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights."); Id. art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled to
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any
kind . .. ."); Economic Covenant, supra note 40, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5 ("The
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States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated . . . will be exercised without discrimination of any kind ... ."); Race
Convention, supra note 46, art. 2(1), 660 U.N.T.S. at 216-19 ("States Parties con-
demn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and
without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms . . .).
The Beijing Platform clearly incorporates the attainment of equality for women as
its primary purpose. See, e.g., Beijing Platform, supra note 1, % 13 ("Women's
empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of
society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to power,
are fimdamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace . . ").
68. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 6, Protocol No. 1, art. 2 ("No
person shall be denied the right to education."); Economic Covenant, supra note
40, art. 13(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 8 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to education."); % 71 of the Beijing Platform states
that:
Education is a human right and an essential tool for achieving the goals
of equality, development and peace. Non-discriminatory education benefits
both girls and boys, and thus ultimately contributes to more equal rela-
tionships between women and men. Equality of access to and attainment
of educational qualifications is necessary if more women are to become
agents of change. Literacy of women is an important key to improving
health, nutrition and education in the family and to empowering women
to participate in decision-making in society.
Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 71; Id. ch. IV, sec. B (on women's education).
69. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 18 ("Everyone has the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. .. ."); European Convention,
supra note 6, art. 9(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 230 ("Everyone has the right to freedom
of... religion; this right includes freedom to change h[er religion .... "). 25
of the Beijing Platform states that:
Religion, spirituality and belief play a central role in the lives of millions
of women and men, in the way they live and in the aspirations they
have for the future. The right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion is inalienable and must be universally enjoyed. This right in-
cludes the freedom to have or to adopt the religion or belief of their
choice either individually or in community with others, in public or in
private, and to manifest their religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching. In order to realize equality, development and
peace, there is a need to fully respect these rights and freedoms. Reli-
gion, thought, conscience and belief may, and can, contribute to fulfilling
women's and men's moral, ethical and spiritual needs and to realizing
their full potential in society. However, it is acknowledged that any form
of extremism may have a negative impact on women and can lead to
violence and discrimination.
Beijing Platform, supra note 1, % 25; Id. 12.
70. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 12(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 ("Everyone
lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right
to liberty of movement and freedom to choose h[er] residence."); Universal Declara-
tion, supra note 6, art. 13 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each State. . . . [And] the right to leave any coun-
try, including h[er] own, and to return to h[er] country.").
71. See, e.g., ICPD, supra note 6, princ. 9 (I"he family is the basic unit of
society and as such should be strengthened. It is entitled to receive comprehensive
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sion-making regarding the number of children and their spac-
ing,72 information, 3 life, liberty, security of the person, integ-
rity of the person,"4 freedom from torture,75 freedom from
protection and support."); CDPOA, supra note 6, commitment 4(k) ("At the national
Revel we will] . . . [s]trengthen institutions that enhance social integration, recog-
nizing the central role of the family and providing it with an environment that
assures its protection and support."). % 30 of the Beijing Platform states that:
Women play a critical role in the family. The family is the basic unit of
society and as such should be strengthened. It is entitled to receive com-
prehensive protection and support. In different cultural, political and
social systems, various forms of the family exist. The rights, capabilities
and responsibilities of family members must be respected. Women make
a great contribution to the welfare of the family and to the development
of society, which is still not recognized or considered in its full impor-
tance. The social significance of maternity, motherhood and the role of
parents in the family and in the upbringing of children should be ac-
knowledged. The upbringing of children requires shared responsibility of
parents, women and men and society as a whole. Maternity, motherhood,
parenting and the role of women in procreation must not be a basis for
discrimination nor restrict the full participation of women in society.
Recognition should also be given to the important role often played by
women in many countries in caring for other members of their family.
Beijing Platform, supra note 1, % 30.
72. See Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 9 98 ("The ability of women to control
their own fertility forms an important basis for the enjoyment of other rights.");
see also ICPD, supra note 6, q 7.3 ("[A]ll couples and individuals [have the right]
to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children
and to have the information and means to do so . . . ."); Women's Convention,
supra note 47, art. 16(1)(e), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20 (Women have "the same rights
to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their chil-
dren ... ."); REPORT OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WOMEN'S YEAR, MEXICO CITY 1975, art. 12, U.N. Doc. EICONF.66/34, U.N. Sales
No. S.76.IV.1 (1976) ("Every couple and every individual has the right to decide
freely and responsibly whether or not to have children as well as to determine the
number and spacing, and to have information, education and the means to do
so."); NAIROBI FORWARD-LOOKING STRATEGIES FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, %
156, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.116/28fRev.1, U.N. Sales No. S.85.IV.10 (1986) ('[all cou-
ples and individuals have the basic human right to decide freely and informally
the number and spacing of their children"). See generally THE HUMAN RIGHTS
FRAMEWORK OF THE BEIJING PLATFORM OF ACTION (Rhonda Copelon et al. eds.
1995).
73. Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 1 35 ("Ensure women's equal access to
economic resources including land, credit, science and technology, vocational train-
ing, information ... ."); Id. f 57 ("Particularly in developing countries, the pro-
ductive capacity of women should be increased through access to ... informa-
tion . . . .').
74. See African Charter, supra note 44, art. 4, 21 I.L.M. at 60 (right to life
and integrity of the person); American Convention, supra note 43, arts. 4, 5, 1144
U.N.T.S. at 145-46 (right to life, right to "physical, mental and moral integrity");
ICPD, supra note 6, princ. 1; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra
note 5, passim. q 118 of the Beijing Platform states that:
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slavery,76 political participation7 7 free assembly and associa-
tion," work,79 enjoyment of the benefits of scientific prog-
ress,80  development,"1  environment, 2  peace, 3  democra-
Acts or threats of violence, whether occurring within the home or in the
community, or perpetrated or condoned by the State, instill fear and
insecurity in women's lives and are obstacles to the achievement of
equality and for development and peace. The fear of violence, including
harassment, is a permanent constraint on the mobility of women and
limits their access to resources and basic activities.
Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 118; Id. ch. IV, sec. D passim (on violence and
women).
75. See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 43, art. 5(2), 1144 U.N.T.S. at
146 ("No one shall be subjected to torture . . . ."); African Charter, supra note 44,
art. 5, 21 I.L.M. at 60 ("All forms of exploitation and degradation of [hu]man[s]
particularly . . . torture . . . shall be prohibited."); ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 7,
999 U.N.T.S. at 175 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."); Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 5 13 ("Grave
violations of the human rights of women occur, particularly in times of armed
conflict, and include murder, torture, systematic rape, forced pregnancy and forced
abortion, in particular under policies of 'ethnic cleansing'.").
76. See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 44, art. 5, 21 IL.M. at 60 ("All
forms of exploitation and degradation of [hu]man[s] particularly slavery . . . shall
be prohibited."); Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 1 131(a) (Actions to be taken by
governments include consideration of ratifying and enforcing international conven-
tions on trafficking and slavery.).
77. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 21(1) ("Everyone has
the right to take part in the government of h[er] country, directly or through
chosen representatives."); ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 25(a), 999 U.N.T.S. at 179
("Every citizen shall have the right . . . [t]o take part in the conduct of public af-
fairs . . . ."); Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 9 135 ("If women are to play an
equal part in securing and maintaining peace, they must be empowered politically
and economically and represented adequately at all levels of decision-making.").
183 states that:
Women's equal participation in decision-making is not only a demand for
simple justice or democracy but can also be seen as a necessary condition
for women's interests to be taken into account. Without the active par-
ticipation of women and the incorporation of women's perspective at all
levels of decision-making, the goals of equality, development and peace
cannot be achieved.
Id. 183.
78. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 20(1) ("Everyone has
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association."); ICCPI supra note 6,
art. 21, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178 ("The right of peaceful assembly shall be recog-
nized."); Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 192(c) (Governments should take actions
to "[p]rotect and promote the equal rights of women and men to engage in politi-
cal activities and to freedom of association .... ").
79. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 23(1) ("Everyone has
the right to work . . . ."); Women's Convention, supra note 47, art. 11(1)(a), 1249
U.N.T.S. at 18 ("The right to work is an inalienable right of all human be-
ings . . . ."); Beijing Platform, supra note 1, ch. IV, sec. A passim (on women and
poverty).
80. See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 44, art. 22(1), 21 II.M. at 62 ("All
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cy,84 self-determination,"5  and solidarity,"6  to name various
peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development
with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the
common heritage of [hu]mankind."); CDPOA, supra note 6, commitment 4(c) ("[A]t
the national level, we will . . . [p]romote access for all to education, information,
technology and know-how as essential means for enhancing communication and
participation in civil, political, economic, social and cultural life . . . ."); Economic
Covenant, supra note 40, art. 15(1)(b), 993 U.N.T.S. at 9 ("The States Parties to
the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone . . . to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications . . . ."); Beijing Platform, supra note 1,
57 ("Particularly in developing countries, the productive capacity of women should
be increased through access to . . . technology . . ").
81. See, e.g., ICPD, supra note 6, princ. 3 ("The right to development is a
universal and inalienable right ... ."); CDPOA, supra note 6, commitment (1)(m)
("[A]t the national level, we will ... [rleaffirm and promote all human rights,
which are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, including the
right to development . . . ."); Economic Covenant, supra note 40, art. 1(1), 993
U.N.T.S. at 5 ("All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development."); Women's Convention, supra note 47, pmbl.,
1249 U.N.T.S. at 14-16; Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 128,
U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, arts. 1, 2, 6-8, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53
(1986); Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 5, 10; Beijing
Platform, supra note 1, 220 ('Every person should be entitled to participate in,
contribute to and enjoy cultural, economic, political and social development. In
many cases women and girls suffer discrimination in the allocation of economic
and social resources. This directly violates their economic, social and cultural
rights.").
82. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 31, princ. 1 ("Human beings are at
the center of concerns for sustainable development."); African Charter, supra note
44, art. 24, 21 IJ..M. at 63 ("All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfac-
tory environment favorable to their development."); Beijing Platform, supra note 1,
ch. IV, sec. K passim (on women and the environment).
83. See African Charter, supra note 44, art. 23(1), 21 IL.M. at 62 ("All peo-
ples shall have the right to national and international peace and security.");
Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 13 ("Women's empowerment and their full partic-
ipation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in
the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the
achievement of equality, development and peace."); Id. ch. IV, sec. E passim (on
women and armed conflict).
84. See Franck, supra note 43; see also Grossman, supra note 8, at 1305;
Beijing Platform, supra note 1, % 15 ("Equal rights, opportunities and access to
resources, equal sharing of responsibilities for the family by men and women, and
a harmonious partnership between them are critical to their well-being and that of
their families as well as to the consolidation of democracy."); Id. % 183 ("Achieving
the goal of equal participation of women and men in decision-making will provide
a balance that more accurately reflects the composition of society and is needed in
order to strengthen democracy and promote its proper functioning.").
85. See African Charter, supra note 44, art. 20(1), 21 I.L.M. at 62 ("All peo-
ples . . . shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determina-
tion."); Women's Convention, supra note 47, pmbl., 1249 U.N.T.S. at 14-16; ICCPR,
supra note 6, pmbl., art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 172-73; Economic Covenant, supra
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of the rights pertinent to the protection of women's interna-
tional status and condition as human beings.
By addressing these substantive rules first, this article
takes an easy route. Without exception, the international in-
struments that define human rights expressly mandate sex
equality and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. '
With such clear formal pronouncements requiring gender equi-
ty, it is intriguing, but given the historical context not all that
surprising, that gender inequality persists. As the following
section will show, despite the rules that the lofty aspirational
goals of equality have fallen far short of expectations and obli-
gations creating a large schism exists between women's "paper"
rights and the realities of their everyday lives.
note 40, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5; Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 147(a) (Ac-
tions to be taken by governments include reaffirming "the right of self-determina-
tion of all peoples, in particular of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien
domination or foreign occupation, and the importance of the effective realization of
this right ....- ).
86. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 55(b), 56 (taking joint action to solve problems);
Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 22 (entitlement to national and interna-
tional cooperation); Women's Convention, supra note 47, pmbl., 1249 U.N.T.S. at
14-16 (affirming duty of cooperation); Economic Covenant, supra note 40, art. 11,
993 U.N.T.S. at 7 (importance of international cooperation); American Convention,
supra note 43, art. 26, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 152 (adopt measures for international
cooperation); DEVAW, supra note 5, art. 5(a) (foster international and regional
cooperation); Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 5, 91 1, 8,
11, 18, 21 (international cooperation to attain various goals); ICPD, supra note 6,
princ. 15, 91 8.9, 14.16 (international cooperation and universal solidarity to attain
goals); CDPOA, supra note 6, commitments 1-3, 5-6, 9-10, %% 26(a), 82, 94 (inter-
national cooperation to attain goals); Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 91 16 ("Hence,
it is indispensable to search for new alternatives . . . based on a holistic approach
to all aspects of development: growth, equality between men and women, . . .
sustainability, solidarity, participation, peace and respect for human rights."); Id. %
196(a) (Women's and non-governmental organizations should "[b]uild and strength-
en solidarity among women through information, education and sensitization activi-
ties . . ").
87. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., art. 55; Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 2;
ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 3, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174; Economic Covenant, supra note
40, arts. 2-3, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5; Women's Convention, supra note 47, passim;
American Convention, supra note 43, art. 1, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 145; European Con-
vention, supra note 6, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232; African Charter, supra note
44, art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 60; Race Convention, supra note 46, pmbl., 660 U.N.T.S.
at 212-13.
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IV. WOMEN'S REALITIES
Ironically, the first place where women's voices must be
raised and their presence made visible is in the very same
formal rules' constructs discussed above. The international
instruments that define human rights-the U.N. Charter,
8
the Universal Declaration,89 the ICCPR, ° the Economic Cov-
enant," regional instruments,92  and substantive human
rights instruments such as the Women's Convention93 and the
Race Convention,94 facially provide protections on the basis of
sex. However, the implementation of these human rights docu-
ments must be reformulated to protect in practice. Women's
articulated rights must be translated to compel real, not virtu-
al, equality.
Unlike theory, the reality for women has been that, until
the Women's Convention,95 and Vienna, Cairo, Copenhagen
and Beijing," in both the formal context and in the parallel
track, women's voices and perspectives were absent from the
international human rights discourse and structure. Women
were not present when the rules were being crafted and thus
the rules were not made by women for women or with women
in mind.97 Consequently, women's problems, issues, and con-
88. U.N. CHARTER.
89. Universal Declaration, supra note 6.
90. ICCPR, supra note 6.
91. Economic Covenant, supra note 40.
92. See American Convention, supra note 43; African Charter, supra note 44;
European Convention, supra note 6.
93. Women's Convention, supra note 47.
94. Race Convention, supra note 46.
95. Women's Convention, supra note 47.
96. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 5; ICPD, supra
note 6; CDPOA, supra note 6; Beijing Platform, supra note 1.
97. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 11, at 621-34.
In March 1991, women headed their country's government in 4 of the
159 member states of the United Nations. In mid-1989, at cabinet level
only 3.5% of the ministries in 155 countries were held by women, and 99
nations had no women ministers. States are slow to make women perma-
nent representatives to the United Nations: in March 1990, 4 out of 149
were women.
Id. at 622 n.56 (citations omitted). Further, there has only been one woman at the
bench at the International Court of Justice, and "no woman has ever been a mem-
ber of the International Law Commission." Id. at 623-24. Additionally, "[in
1991 . . . there were 2 women (out of 18) on the Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights Committee, 1 (out of 18) on the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 2 (out of 18) on the Human Rights Committee, and 2 (out of 10)
630
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cerns were not central to the rights framework. The invisibility
of women as rule-makers led to the inevitable, surreal struggle
to assert simply that women are human beings too, and thus
entitled to the rights and freedoms contained in international
human rights norms."
It is important to emphasize the significance of the
Women's Convention which, by focusing on gender issues,
places women's interests and concerns at center stage. 9 This
treaty articulates the goal of establishing equality for all wom-
en in all aspects of public and private life, including health,
education, and political participation.' 0 The Women's Con-
on the Committee against Torture. Id. at 624 n.67; see also UNTDR 1995, supra
note 2, at 42 (noting that worldwide there are only 10 women who are political
leaders in their countries and that women only hold 10% of slots in parliaments
and 6% of the cabinet posts of ministerial work); Diane Bell, Considering Gender:
Are Human Rights for Women, Too? An Australian Case, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 339, 350 (Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992) [hereinafter CROSS-CULTURAL] (noting that recent
moves to enfranchise Australian Aboriginal women were protected on basis of
tradition, thereby depriving them of knowledge of certain rights under the
Women's Convention).
98. See Cecilia Medina-Quiroga, Remarks, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 693, 1093 (1995).
99. See Natalie H. Kaufman & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Critiquing Gender-Neu-
tral Treaty Language: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 114 (proposing
criteria to analyze gender-neutral laws); Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for
Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 125, 158-69 (1994)
(discussing state responsibility under Women's Convention).
100. See Women's Convention, supra note 47, art. 7, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17
("States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the political and public life of the country.. . "); Id. art.
14(2)(b), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 19 (Women have the right "[t]o have access to adequate
health care facilities . . . ."); Id. art. 10, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17 ("States Parties shall
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order
to ensure them equal rights with men in the field of education .... "); see also
ICPD, supra note 6, princ. 8 ("Everyone has the right to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health."); Id. princ. 4 ("The full
and equal participation of women in civil [and] political . . . life . . . are priority
objectives of the international community."); Id. princ. 10 ("Everyone has the right
to education . . . ."); CDPOA, supra note 6, commitment 4(c) ("[Alt the national
level we will . . . [plromote access for all to education . . . ."); Id. commitment 5
("We commit ourselves to . . . achieving equality ... between women and men,
and to recognizing and enhancing the participation and leadership roles of women
in political ... [and] civil ... life . . . ."); Id. commitment 5(d) ("We shall ...
[take appropriate measures to ensure, on the basis of equality of men and wom-
en, universal access to health-care services."); Beijing Platform, supra note 1, strat.
obj. B.1 ("Ensure equal access to education"); Id. strat. obj. C.1 ("Increase women's
access ... to ... health care."); Id. strat. obj. G.1 ("Take measures to ensure
women's equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision-
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vention, by taking a holistic approach to women's rights and
lives, is a testament to the indivisibility of rights and the hu-
manity of women.
In reviewing the realities of women's lives worldwide in
the context of international women's human rights, two dis-
tressing facts surface. First, the rules are, at best, imperfect
and, at worst, venal in effecting women's exclusion-silencing
women's voices and rendering them invisible. Second, as far as
universally enjoying human rights-women simply do not. This
is as true in the West as it is in the East, and in the North as
it is in the South. The condition of women, as evidenced by the
on-going tragedies in Bosnia,1"' Haiti," 2  and
Rwanda'° 3-- where women have been pillaged and raped as
instruments or prizes of war"'4-illustrates that women are a
making.").
101. See Letter from the International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic at
City University of New York School of Law, to the Secretary-General, Organization
of American States, The Member States and the General Assembly 1 (June 1994)
(on file with author) [hereinafter IWHRLC ("On March 23, the UN/OAS Observer
Mission reported . .. that 12 women and girls had been raped in Port-au-Prince
and concluded that it appeared that rape was being used as an instrument of
terror against the female population of Haiti who were suspected or designated as
opponents of the illegal regime."). IWHRLC demanded effective investigation,
publicization and prosecution of crimes. Id. at 2. See also, Knop, supra note 2, at
294 n.4 (citing Donna E. Arzt, Genocidal Rape in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia
and the Role of International Law, Paper presented at Rape as Genocide in
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia: A Symposium on War Crimes, Rights, and Inter-
national Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Apr. 1993) (unpublished manu-
script)); Copelon, supra note 30, at 197 (commenting on mass rape of women in
former Yugoslavia); Jasmine Kuzmanovi6, Legacies of Invisibility: Past Silence,
Present Violence Against Women in the Former Yugoslavia, in FEMINIST PERSPEC-
TIVES, supra note 5, at 57 (for accounts of rape in Bosnia).
102. See IWHRLC, supra note 101.
103. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 104TH CONG., 1ST SESs., COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994, at 206 (1995) (Comm. Print 1995) [herein-
after COUNTRY REPORTS 1994] (noting rapes on massive scale by combattant forc-
es).
104. See Copelon, supra note 30, at 197, 204 (discussing rape of women as
"booty" of war). Rape was not treated as a crime for which the Japanese Com-
mander would be separately charged at the Judgment of the Military Tribunal in
Tokyo. Id. at 197. There existed the systematic rapes in both World Wars, includ-
ing the "rape of German women by the conquering Russian army and the enslave-
ment on the battlefields of 200,000-400,000 'comfort women' by the Japanese ar-
my." Id. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 5, which
coincided with the revelation of the mass rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including a
general condemnation of gender violence as well as making specific mention of
"'systemic rape, sexual slavery and forced pregnancy' in armed conflict." Copelon,
supra note 30, at 198 (citing Report of the Drafting Committee, Addendum, Final
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long way from being universally respected or heard, let alone
safe.
Significantly, this is not a woman's reality solely in times
of war. One need not go to Bosnia or even to war for evidence
of women's inequality. One need only look at the realities of
everyday life. The United Nations, no bastion of gender equali-
ty, confirms the persistent and prevailing gender disparities in
its description of women as the "largest excluded group in the
world." °5 This sad truth of women's subordinate status is
borne out regardless of which statistics are considered: em-
ployment, economics, personal autonomy, education, political
participation, health or personal security (i.e., freedom from
violence)' 6 -all matters that are critical to women's enjoy-
Outcome of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157IPC/Add. 1 (June 24, 1993)); see also Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper,
Introduction, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that rape by
soldiers is among gendered crimes suffered by women).
The rape of women in war is not limited to global wars. For example, as
part of an investigatory mission in Peru, members of Amnesty International ques-
tioned a military commander whether his soldiers ever raped women:
"Yes, of course." That was followed up with the statement that when you
have men who are headquartered away from their homes for a long
time . . . they need to have their needs met somehow. There was not
even the sense that this person should take care and deny [this]. When
they raised the question of torture, of course that was denied. But there
wasn't even the sense that [rape] was something that should be looked
at askance. (Roach 11/17/93).
Friedman, supra note 11, at 26; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 1163,
1993 WL 385757 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1993); Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
105. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT 1993, at 25 (1993) [hereinafter UNHDR 1993]. The Report labeled
women as a "non-participating majority" because despite the fact that women con-
stitute a majority of the world's population, they "receive only a small share of
developmental opportunities." Id.; see also Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol, Out in Left
Field: Cuba's Post-Cold War Strikeout, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 15, 30 (1994) (out-
lining different results in Cuba than those reported in UN-DR 1993); Siobhan
Dowd, Women and the Word: The Silencing of the Feminine, in FEMINIST PERSPEC-
TIVES, supra note 5, at 317 (describing how women's illiteracy silences their voic-
es).
106. See UNHDR 1993, supra note 105, at 25 (highlighting routine exclusion of
women from "educational [opportunities] or from better jobs, from political systems
or from adequate health care); UNITED NATIONS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, at 96 (1994) [hereinafter
UNHDR 1994] (conceding that "men generally fare better than women on almost
every socio-economic indicator"); see also UNTIDR 1993, supra note 105, at 29
(expressing the existence of a "widespread pattern of inequality between men and
women . . . in their access to education, health and nutrition, and even more in
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ment of their international human rights and freedoms. Not-
withstanding the existing "paper rights," the universal fact is
that women are routinely subjected to torture,10 7 starva-
tion,' terrorism,' °  humiliation,"' mutilation,"'
rape,"2 multiple birth and other maternity-related health
their participation in the economic and political spheres"); Hernndez, supra note
105, at 30-31 (detailing analogous situation women confront in Cuba notwithstand-
ing paper commitments to equality). Moreover, Charlotte Bunch has observed that:
The importance of control over women can be seen in the intensity of
resistance to laws and social changes that put control of women's bodies
in women's hands: reproductive rights; freedom of sexuality whether,
heterosexual or lesbian; laws that criminalize rape in marriage and so
on. Abusing women physically maintains this territorial domination and
is sometimes accompanied by other forms of human rights abuse such as
slavery (forced prostitution), sexual terrorism (rape), or imprisonment
(confinement to the home).
Bunch, supra note 9, at 15."
107. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1994, supra note 103, at 557 ("There are credible
reports that some women detainees in Tibet have been tortured . . . ."); Bunch,
supra note 8, at 16 ("Rape has been recognized by the rapporteur of the United
Nations on torture as a form of torture when it is performed by police or by other
agents of the government . ").
108. See UNHDR 1994, supra note 106, at 27 ('[In South Asia, 30% of babies
born are underweight . . . a sad indication of inadequate access to food, particular-
ly for women, who are often the last to eat in the household."); WOMEN'S HEALTH,
supra note 20, at 8, 22-23 (discussing that malnutrition often results in women
and girls because males are often fed first when food is scarce); Bunch, supra note
9, at 16 (malnutrition of girls as form of genocide); Indira Jaising, Violence
Against Women: The Indian Perspective, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5,
at 51 ("Girl[s] . . . are fed less and for shorter periods and are not given foods
like butter or milk, which are reserved for boys.").
109. See Bunch, supra note 9, at 16 ("Women face terrorism in the form of
sexual assault on the streets and in jobs where sexual harassment is a condition
for receiving a paycheck.").
110. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1994, at 361 (1993) [hereinafter
HRWWR 1994] (describing forced virginity control exams on Turkish women); Id.
at 359 (noting Peruvian practice of questioning rape victims at judicial proceedings
about their "honor" and sexual past).
111. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1994, supra note 103, at 252 (describing prevalence
of female genital mutilation in Sudan); see also Nahid F. Toubia, The Social and
Political Implications of Female Circumcision: The Case of The Sudan, in WOMEN
AND THE FAMILY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: NEW VOICES OF CHANGE 148 (Elizabeth
Warnock Fernea ed., 1985); Nahid Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 224 [hereinafter Toubia, Female Genital Mutila-
tion].
112. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1994, supra note 103, at 360 (describing systematic
rapes of women in former Yugoslavia); Id. at 359 (noting that "[sloldiers and po-
lice routinely raped women . . . "); UNHDR 1995, supra note 2, at 105 (noting
"intolerable . . . use of mass violence against women as weapons of war" and that
"[m]ass rape and torture" of women have been documented in recent conflict situa-
tions); see also Bunch, supra note 9, at 16 (noting that rape is human rights viola-
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risks,"3  economic duress," 4  and sexual exploitation,"5
simply because of their sex. Recurrently, these inflictions on
women because of their sex are justified or explained by cul-
ture and tradition: genital mutilation,"' female infanti-
cide,"7  bride burning,' foot-binding,' slavery, 2 ' face-
tion even when committed by private actors); Jaising, supra note 108, at 52, 53
(sexual abuse of women and girls in Indian families is common and rape of wom-
en in police custody is rampant).
113. See infra note 165.
114. See UNi-DR 1995, supra note 2, at 4 ("[v]omen receive a dispropor-
tionately small share of credit"); Id. at 87 ("Much of women's work remains unrec-
ognized and unvalued .... Women's work is greatly undervalued in economic
terms."); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
115. See HRWWR 1994, supra note 110, at 364 (describing trafficking of Ban-
gladesh women in Pakistan and their subsequent arrests); Id. at 361 (noting that
Turkish "police and other state actors were forcing women and girls to undergo
gynecological exams to determine whether they were virgins"); Peters & Wolper,
supra note 104, at 1 (listing sale of girls as one of many gendered-based human
rights violations suffered by women). For story of young girl enslaved in Thai sex
industry, see Hnin Hnin Pyne, AIDS and Gender Violence: The Enslavement of
Burmese Women in the Thai Sex Industry, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note
5, at 215, 215-23 (Most Burmese girls/women working in Thai brothels were
tricked and sold into slavery with brothel owners paying agents the equivalent of
$120-$200 (U.S.) per girl/woman. These girls/women are only released after paying
that amount back to the owner, in whose hands the calculations are done. Their
movements are restricted and they are prohibited from refusing sexual services to
any number of clients (in some cases, 20 per day). Since few customers use con-
doms, the girls/women are at high risk for contracting HIVAIDS and few have
knowledge of how the disease is actually spread.); see also Jaising, supra note 108,
at 53 (discussing practice in some parts of India where teenage girls are dedicated
to Hindu gods and goddesses and then are sexually exploited); Zhu Hong, The
Testimony of Women Writers: The Situation of Women in China Today, in FEMI-
NIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 96, 97 (widespread practice of abduction and
sale of women as sex slaves).
116. See supra note 111.
117. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1994, supra note 103, at 561 ("[Blecause of the
traditional [Chinese] preference for male children ... some families have used
ultrasound to identify and abort female fetuses."); Id. at 562 ("Female infanticide
may also be a factor in some areas of China."); see also Sharon K Hom, Female
Infanticide in China: The Human Rights Specter and Thoughts Towards (An)other
Vision, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249 (1991); Bunch, supra note 9, at 16
(female infanticide as form of genocide); Jaising, supra note 108, at 51 (noting that
many women choose to abort fetuses detected to be female).
118. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1993, at 1230 (Comm. Print 1994) [hereinafter
COUNTRY REPORTS 1993] ("Tn the typical dowry dispute [in India], a groom's family
will harass a woman they believe has not provided sufficient dowry. This harass-
ment sometimes end in the woman's death, which family members often try to
portray as a suicide or kitchen accident .... Government figures show a total of
5,377 dowry deaths in 1993 .... Nonetheless, convictions in dowry death cases
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hiding,121  wife-beating, 2 2  honor-killing, 123  forced pregnan-
cy, 124  forced abortion," and multiple, early and closely
are rare."); cf. UNIIDR 1994, supra note 106, at 31 (women's groups in India put
the number of dowry deaths at 9,000); see also Jaising, supra note 108, at 53, 55
(Author notes that when dowry is not met, if psychological and physical abuse
does not drive the women to suicide, they are often victims of bride burning. She
further reveals in some parts of India the custom of sati still exists where a wid-
ow will be burned or buried alive along with the body of her deceased husband.).
119. See Anna Y. Park, The Marriage Fraud Act Revised: The Continuing Sub-
ordination of Asian and Pacific Islander Women, 1 ASIAN AM. PAC. ISLAND L.J. 29,
47 (1993) (noting that in past, Chinese women were forced to bind their feet until
they became gangerous); Hong, supra note 115, at 96 (noting that gender images
such as foot-binding have been used as symbol of China's "backwardness").
120. The Human Rights Watch World Report 1994 noted that:
An estimated 20,000 to 30,000 Burmese women and girls were believed
to be held in Thai brothels .... Expecting to work in restaurants and
factories, most of them became trapped in brothels instead, under deplor-
able conditions that amounted to a modern form of slavery. The Burmese
were being held in debt bondage and compelled to have sex with as
many as ten to fifteen customers a day in order to pay off their recruit-
ment, transportation and living expenses.
HRWWR 1994, supra note 110, at 360; see also Akram Mirhosseini, After the Rev-
olution: Violations of Women's Human Rights in Iran, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 5, at 72, 73 (noting a form of sexual slavery in Iran, in that a married
woman "must be at all times willing to meet her husband's sexual needs, and if
she refuses, she loses her right to shelter, food, and clothing").
121. COUNTRY REPORTS 1993, supra note 118, at 1281 ("In public, Muslim wom-
en are required to wear the abaya, headscarf and face veil .... Saudi authorities
have repeatedly said that non-Muslim women need not wear the abaya and
headscarf. However, the Mutawwa'in [volunteer religious police] have increasingly
tried to force all foreign women to wear the abaya and cover their hair."); see also
Mirhosseini, supra note 120, at 74-75.
To be sure, very recently a Turkish mother and daughter were killed by
male relatives for not observing the Islamic dress code, and an Islamic gunman in
Gumushane assassinated the leader of a legal association who would not let fe-
male lawyers wear head scarves in court. Islamic Dress Code Deaths, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1995, at AS.
122. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1994, supra note 103, at 567 (according to survey
of 2,100 Chinese families, "one-fifth of all wives had been abused by their spous-
es.").
123. See Mirhosseini, supra note 120, at 73 ("A husband, father, or brother has
the right to kill his wife, daughter, or sister-and go unpunished-if he finds her
committing an 'immoral' or 'unchaste' act (such as having sex with a man not her
husband.)"); see also Mertus, supra note 5, at 140 (In Brazil, wife killings, called
"honor killings" often went unpunished, and in one year almost eight hundred
husbands killed their wives.); James Brooke, 'Honor' Killings of Wives is Outlawed
in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991, at B16.
124. The Human Rights Watch World Report 1994 noted that:
Women victims of rape reported being threatened with forcible impregna-
tion. A number of women recounted that, as they were being assaulted,
rapists taunted them with ethnic slurs or stated their intentions to im-
pregnate the victims. J., a thirty-nine-year-old Croatian woman who was
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spaced, child-bearing and birthing,'26 to name but a few.
These practices, that some accept without protest because they
are based on sex, would be inconceivable to justify if they were
instead predicated upon another protected classification, such
as race (although until recently culture and tradition were
used to justify racial discrimination, including apartheid and
slavery).27 Yet, all these practices, individually and collec-
tively, interfere with women's general well-being and perpetu-
ate women's second-class status and conditions.
In fact, the United States Department of State (another
institution whose crowning glory is certainly not gender equali-
ty), recognizes "the problem of rampant discrimination against
raped by a reserve captain of the self-proclaimed "Serbian Republic" in
the Omarska detention camp, told us, "They said I was an Ustasa and
that I needed to give birth to a Serb-that I would then be different."
HRWWR 1994, supra note 110, at 360; see also Bunch, supra note 9, at 16 ("com-
pulsory pregnancy both kills women and forces them into involuntary labor").
125. Reproductive freedom includes the right to have or to refrain from having
an abortion. The latter, albeit not the usual perspective, is an important consider-
ation because large, populous countries, notably India and China, in an attempt to
curb tremendous populations, not only encourage but also often apply coercive
pressure on women to have abortions - even when women would rather carry the
child. For a discussion of China's coercive population control policies, see E. Tobin
Shiers, Coercive Population Control Policies: An Illustration of The Need For a
Conscientious Objector Provision for Asylum Seekers, 30 VA. J. INTL L. 1007, 1010-
16 (1990); COUNTRY REPORTS 1994, supra note 103, at 561 ("Chinese officials ac-
knowledge privately that there are instances of forced abortions and steriliza-
tions."); Herndndez, supra note 21, passim; Jaising, supra note 108, at 51 (noting
that in India, many women are forced to abort if fetus is detected as female);
Hong, supra note 115, at 97 (discussing recent Chinese government plan for forced
sterilization and abortion).
126. See WOMEN'S HEALTH, supra note 20, at 30-32 (noting that woman's right
to found family includes right to "plan, time and space the births of children so as
to maximize their health and her own."). For the origins of these rights, see DE-
PARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, POPULATION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EXPERT GROUP MEETING ON POPULATION
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (United Nations 1990); Hernndez, supra note 21, at 310 n.9
(noting documents which recognize right to determine freely and responsibly num-
ber and spacing of children); Rebecca J. Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies: Chal-
lenges and Opportunities, 1989 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 61, 67 (Supp.
3) (noting that pregnancies that come too early or too late in reproductive lives,
too close to another pregnancy, or too frequently raise rates of maternal mortality).
127. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence M, Forward: Race, Multiculturalism and
the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1995) (noting system
of apartheid was based on race). Interestingly, the United States once utilized a
similar cultural justification to sanction the institution and maintenance of slavery.
See Mikell, supra note 8.
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women,"12 and the resulting myriad human rights violations
women suffer simply because of their sex."s Women world-
wide are rendered invisible and silenced by being killed,""
physically abused into submission, 3' and even starved.
13 2
128. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1993, supra note 118, at xvi.
129. Basically, the Department of State agrees with and confirms the UN.'s
evaluation concerning the status of women worldwide. The State Department re-
ports that there exists:
the problem of rampant discrimination against women. Physical abuse is
the most obvious example. In many African countries, the practice of
female genital mutilation continued. In Pakistan, many women in police
custody are subjected to sexual or physical violence. On several conti-
nents, women and girls are sold into prostitution. In many Gulf coun-
tries, domestic servants from Southeast Asia are forced to work excessive-
ly long hours and are sometimes physically and sexually abused. In Ban-
gladesh and India, dowry deaths continue. Marital rape in many coun-
tries is not recognized as a crime, and women raped or beaten at home
often have no recourse. That female life is not valued as much as male
life is apparent in countries such as China where it is reported that
more female fetuses than male are aborted.
COUNTRY REPORT 1993, supra note 118, at xvi; see also Cook, supra note 99, at
129 n.19 (citing Andrew Byrnes, Women, Feminism and International Human
Rights Law: Methodological Myopia, Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful
Marginalization?, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 205, 214 (1992)).
130. For example, the Shining Path insurgency in Peru "often murdered [wom-
en], either to punish, intimidate, or coerce particular female victims or as part of
their efforts to achieve broader political ends." HRWWR 1994, supra note 110, at
359. The greater value placed on males is sometimes evidenced before birth. In
some countries pre-natal testing is used to ascertain the sex of the fetus which
may then be aborted if it proves to be female. UNHDR 1995, supra note 2, at 7.
Such sex-based feticide is arguably a violation of human rights. See, e.g., ICPD,
supra note 6, 4.23 ("Governments are urged to take the necessary measures to
prevent infanticide, prenatal sex selection, trafficking in girl children and use of
girls in prostitution and pornography."). Similarly, the phenomenon of "Missing
women"-a shortfall of the expected male to female ratio in population-estimated
at over 100 million women is attributed to the lack of value in female life ranging
from feticide to less adequate nutrition being provided to girls than boys. UNIDR
1995, supra note 2, at 7, 35.
131. See supra note 117; see also UNHDR 1994, supra note 106, at 31 ("In no
society are women secure or treated equally to men .... And from childhood
through adulthood, they are abused because of their gender.... It was recently
estimated that one-third of wives in developing countries are physically battered.
One woman in 2,000 in the world is reported to have been raped."); UN-DR
1995, supra note 2, at 7 (studies in various countries show: sexual abuse of fe-
males during childhood or adolescence; a million children in Asia, mostly girls, are
forced into prostitution; approximately 100 million girls experience FGM; high
percentages of married women experience domestic violence; high percentages of
women are raped in their lifetimes; a high percentage of women are murdered by
present or former partners; marital violence is a leading cause of female suicide).
132. See supra note 108; UNIDR 1995, supra note 2, at 35 ("[P]erception is
widespread that infant boys are fed more adequately than infant girls .... [And]
1996] FORMULA FOR REFORM 639
In addition to such direct physical abuses, women's human
rights and freedoms are further imperiled by the systematic
denial of their political,133  economic,'34  social,
3
' civil, 13 6
and other legal rights which purportedly ensure women!'s full
participation in the cultural and political life of the state.3 7
Even as we approach the 21st century in today's world, some
women are still silenced by exclusion from such basic activities
as voting,'38  traveling, 9  and testifying in court. 4 °  In
[a]dult women suffer more than men from malnutrition . . . ").
133. The right to political participation is guaranteed by, inter alia, Universal
Declaration, supra note 6, art. 21; ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at
179; Women's Convention, supra note 47, arts. 7-8, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17; European
Convention, supra note 6, arts. 10-11, 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230-31; American Con-
vention, supra note 43, arts. 16, 23, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 149, 151; African Charter,
supra note 44, art. 13, 21 IL.M. at 61.
134. See, e.g., Economic Covenant, supra note 40, passim. Specifically, art.
11(2)(a)-(b) requires equitable distribution of resources. Id. art. 11(2)(a)-(b), 993
U.N.T.S. at 7. In addition, the Women's Convention, supra note 47, arts. 13(b), 14,
1249 U.N.T.S. at 19, seeks specifically to ensure equal access to economic resourc-
es to women. The recently-concluded conference documents also focus on the need
for women's economic empowerment. See, e.g., ICPD, supra note 6, princ. 3, J 3.16
(right to development), princ. 10, 91 4.2, 4.4, 4.12, 4.18, 4.29, 11.1, 11.16 (educa-
tion), 9[ 3.18 (employment), 3.22, 4.1 (economic resources); CDPOA, supra note 6,
commitment 1, % 15 (right to development), commitment 5 (education), commitme-
nts 3(c), (f), 5(j), 91 45, 51(d), 73(d), 82 (employment), 9 26, commitments 1, 2, 3,
6, 9, 91 26(e), (g), 56(c) (economic resources). Much of the discourse in Beijing sur-
rounded women's much-needed access to economic resources including the issue of
women's non-remunerated employment. Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 99 158,
167, 209, 212, 62, 167 (access to resources), 60, 163, 180 (access to employment in
terms of eliminating gender differences in salary and available jobs); see also
Nadia H. Youssef, Women's Access to Productive Resources: The Need for Legal
Instruments to Protect Women's Development Rights, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 5, at 279, 279-84 (noting that land reform laws and resettlement pro-
grams in particular discriminate against women who also experience discrimination
in access to livestock and credit). Nadia Youssef explained that:
Excluding women from the bases of rural productivity has been achieved
by: (1) denying women rights to land ownership; (2) stipulating
'exceptions' for women in cases where full ownership of land is granted
irrespective of sex; and, and most important, (3) 'masculinizing' the head
of household concept on the premise that all families contain an adult
male economically responsible for maintaining women and children.
Id. at 281.
135. See, for example, Economic Covenant, supra note 40, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 pas-
sim, Women's Convention, supra note 47, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 passim, for economic,
social and cultural rights of persons.
136. See, for example, ICCPR, supra note 6, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 passim, Women's
Convention, supra note 47, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 passim, for recognized civil rights of
persons.
137. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 6; Economic Covenant, supra note 40;
Women's Convention, supra note 47, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 passim.
138. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1993, supra note 118, at xvi (noting that women
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addition, women are shut out from economic discourse by being
forbidden to inherit and own property,14 ' and routinely are
denied access to education,14 2  remunerated employment,
1 4 1
throughout world are denied right to vote); Id. at 1231 (Kuwaiti women are denied
right to vote).
139. UNIIDR 1995, supra note 2, at 43 ("In some Arab countries, a husband's
consent is necessary for a wife to obtain a passport, but not vice versa."). In Iran,
married women may not travel abroad without written permission from their hus-
bands or fathers. See id. ("Women cannot leave the country without their
husband's permission in Iran."); Mirhosseini, supra note 120, at 72. This is also
the case in Saudi Arabia, and in Nigeria, where a married woman cannot obtain a
passport without her husband's permission. See generally Marsha A. Freeman, The
Human Rights of Women in the Family: Issues and Recommendations for Imple-
mentation of the Women's Convention, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at
149, 151.
140. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1993, supra note 118, at 1220-21 (under Shar'ia
law in Jordan, a woman's court testimony equals half that of a man).
141. Under Islamic inheritance laws in Kuwait, a Muslim woman may receive
only half of what male heirs receive, and "[u]nder customary law in Africa . . .
where [there] is communal or clan [real] property, a woman has no right to exer-
cise ownership rights over it." Mertus, supra note 5, at 142. Also, in many coun-
tries law and/or tradition dictates that the husband has exclusive control over
marital property. Freeman, supra note 139, at 149, 151, 158-59. For example,
"[m]arried women are under the permanent guardianship of their husbands and
have no right to manage property in Botswana, Chile, Lesotho, Namibia and Swa-
ziland." -NI-DR 1995, supra note 2, at 43.
142. Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran:
women have been excluded from 79 out of 159 courses of study in the
university: 55 courses out of 84 in technology and mathematics, 7 out of
40 in natural sciences, and 17 out of the remaining 33. Only 50 percent
of women who passed the entrance examination in medicine have been
allowed to attend. Women have been banned from all four fields of agri-
culture. In the faculties of letters and humanities, only 10 of 35 courses
are available to women, and women are not allowed to study archaeolo-
gy, the restoration of historic monuments, handicrafts, graphics, visual
communications or cinematography. They are banned from the Central
Art Institute. In industrial design, there is the maximum quota of 20
percent women. In most fields, women are denied scholarships and not
allowed to leave Iran for postgraduate study.
Mirhosseini, supra note 120, at 74. Significantly, "[almong the world's 900 million
illiterate people, women outnumber men two to one." UNHDR 1995, supra note 2,
at 34.
143. Moreover, Rebecca Cook has noted that:
Women suffer additional discrimination, however, because roles identified
with female gender are not valued in social and economic terms. Those
who perform domestic and child care work in their own homes are fre-
quently regarded as 'unemployed" and ineligible for non-monetary bene-
fits related to paid employment .... Service roles associated with fe-
males . . . have almost invariably been low paid.
WOMEN'S HEALTH, supra note 20, at 6; see also, UNIIDR 1995, supra note 2, at
43 ("Husbands can restrict a wife's employment outside the home in Bolivia, Gua-
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and health care.' Girls and women have their nutritional
needs and food denied because of their sex.145 Moreover, in a
cruel twist, women even are denied custody of the children
they have borne, simply because of their sex.46 All of these
practices and policies, physical and mental roadblocks to
women's ability to achieve equality and enjoy their human
rights, are often justified by culture. These limitations, exclu-
sions, and denials maintain the status quo and ensure that
women remain ill-equipped to assert, let alone vindicate, their
rights. Considering that the rules formally mandate gender
equality, these facts of life demonstrate that there is a serious
void between the rules of human rights and the realities of
women's lives, with both conspiring to marginalize and sub-
ordinate women.
It is indeed ironic that the discrepancy between the paper
rights and the everyday realities can be explained, in part, by
a review of the very rules that purport to protect women. Not-
withstanding the sex equity/equality rhetoric of the instru-
ments, a scrutiny of some provisions indicates that in the rules
themselves sex, meaning female, is a leading indicator of in-
equality. In fact, many articles in human rights documents ex-
temala and Syria.")
144. See Rebecca J. Cook, International Human Rights and Women's Reproduc-
tive Health, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 256 (noting historical lack
of protection of women's reproductive health rights); WOMEN'S HEALTH, supra note
20; UNITED NATIONS, WOMEN: CHALLENGES TO THE YEAR 2000, at 23 (1991) [here-
inafter CHALLENGES] (women's health needs "are almost everywhere inadequately
addressed").
145. See supra note 108. In Bangladesh, girls have a 70% higher mortality rate
than boys. Girls are more likely to receive less access to health care than boys in
many countries, and in the developing world girls are more than four times as
likely as boys to be malnourished. See CHALLENGES, supra note 144, at 23. A
shocking example of discriminatory health practices is revealed in a picture of a
Pakistani woman holding her two small twins. The boy, who was breast fed, is
plump and healthy-looking. The girl, who was bottle fed, is less than half her
brother's size and obviously near death from malnourishment. The woman's moth-
er-in-law told her that she did not have enough breast milk for both children, so
only the boy was breast fed. The twin sister died the day after the photo was
taken. Id.; see also UNHDR 1995, supra note 2, at 35.
146. For example, Qatari women rarely obtain custody of children after a di-
vorce, and non-Muslim women never do. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1994, supra note
103, at 1163. In Iran, women only obtain custody of children if both the father
and grandfather of the children are dead. See Mirhosseini, supra note 120, at 73;
see also Mertus, supra note 5, at 135, 141 (noting that under Shar'ia, women lose
custody of their children when boys are seven (or reach puberty) and girls are
nine (or of marriageable age)).
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pressly exclude sex as a basis of protecting first, second, and
third generation rights, many of which affect women's well-
being. This existing rights framework creates at least the effect
of excluding women, and at worst the intent to exclude women
from equal participation in, and enjoyment of, internationally
accepted rights and freedoms. These exclusions, purposeful or
not, render women invisible and silent in the human rights
world, making sex less important than other protected classifi-
cations.
For example, notwithstanding the ICCPR's express protec-
tion of gender equality,14 Article 20 provides that "[any ad-
vocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be pro-
hibited by law."' On its face, Article 20 does not proscribe
advocacy of hatred based on sex. Does such omission signify
that advocacy of gender-based "hatred that constitutes incite-
ment to discrimination, hostility or violence" is acceptable, or
even appropriate? Certainly, canons of construction support
and even urge such a conclusion.'49 Moreover, the logical in-
ference of Article 20 is that discrimination, hostility or violence
based on sex is not as venal or heinous as ethnicity-based,
race-based or religion-based hatred. This message is powerful
and frightening, given the prevalence of violence against worn-
147. See ICCPI, supra note 6, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173 ("Each State Par-
ty . . .undertakes to respect and to ensure . . . the rights recognized in the pres-
ent Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . sex ... .
148. Id. art. 20(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
149. See infra note 160 and accompanying text, for discussion of rules of con-
struction.
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en, 150 especially when combined with some of the cultural
pretexts.' 51
Similarly, the Economic Covenant falls short of providing
full protection based on sex. In Article 13, parties to the Cove-
nant recognize and agree that education:
shall be directed to the full development of the human per-
sonality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms....
[And] shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a
150. UNIDR 1995, supra note 2, at 44 ("Violence against women is a universal
issue, crossing boundaries of culture, geography, race, ethnicity, class and reli-
gion."); see Lori L. Heise, Freedom Close to Home: The Impact of Violence Against
Women on Reproductive Rights, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 238,
238 (noting that "[g]ender violence is a major yet often underrecognized obstacle to
reproductive choice"). Violence against women takes many forms. See HRW-WOMEN
1995, supra note 26. It ranges from rape as a weapon of war, id. at 1-97 (setting
out the use of "rape as a weapon of war and a tool of political repression" in
Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Kashmir, and Peru), to sexual assaults against refugee
women, id. at 100-137 (reporting such abuses in Bangladesh and Kenya), to abus-
es against women in custody, id. at 140-191 (detailing such abuses by police in
Pakistan, sexual abuse of prisoners in the United States, sexual assaults by border
patrol agents, and abuses of women detained in Egypt), to trafficking of women
and girls into forced prostitution and coerced marriages, id. at 196-270 (setting
forth information on Burmese women and girls trafficked to Thailand, Nepali wom-
en and girls trafficked to India, Bangladesh women and girls trafficked to Paki-
stan), to abuses (economic violence) against women workers, id. at 274-338 (giving
examples of Asian domestic workers in Kuwait, discrimination against women
workers in Russia, and employment discrimination in post-communist Poland), to
domestic violence, id. at 341-407 (range of domestic violence from wife murder to
battery in Brazil, and domestic violence examples in Russia and South Africa), and
to violence against reproductive, sexual and other human rights, id. at 410-456
(examples inter alia, of forced virginity exams in Turkey of women in custody,
political and prostitution detainees).
151. See Mikell, supra note 8. Professor Mikell highlights the interplay between
cultural notions of inferiority and social-structural relationships that have denied
women equal participation in the articulation, development, implementation and
enforcement of rights. Such gender inequities are compounded by the process of
structural adjustment and women's limited access to judicial fora to vindicate pa-
per rights. Thus cultural, social, economic and legal impediments frustrate goals of
equality and further the poverty in which women live. For example, Professor
Mikell noted that after economic crises and the implementation of structural ad-
justment programs, the increasing male migration, climbing divorce rates, abandon-
ment of wives and children, and reduced maternity services placed women in a
precarious position. See also BALOS & FELLOWS, supra note 5, at 146-57 (describ-
ing exclusion of women from provisions in instruments and contending that dis-
crepancy between rules and reality reveals inclination, if not intent, to exclude
women from certain protections given on other grounds-essentially rendering
women invisible in human rights world-and thereby making sex, meaning female,
worthless).
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free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all nations racial, ethnic, or religious groups, and
further the activities of the United Nations for the mainte-
nance of peace. 5'
In a paragraph that explicitly enumerates the classes protect-
ed, gender again stands out because of its absence. This omis-
sion in Article 13 signifies that exclusion from participation in
a free society on the basis of sex is not only acceptable but the
rule of law. This exclusion of sex is significant because of the
paramount importance of education to women's self-determina-
tion, overall well-being, and particularly to the attainment of
human rights."3
Not surprisingly, the regional instruments are similarly
flawed. For example, the American Convention effects an ex-
clusion almost identical to that found in Article 20 of the
ICCPR'54 The African Charter excludes sex in its prohibition
of mass expulsions,' making gender-based expulsions, at
152. Economic Covenant, supra note 40, art. 13, 993 U.N.T.S. at 8 (emphasis
added).
153. See CDPOA, supra note 6, commitment 6(e). By this provision, the Mem-
ber States promised to "[einsure full and equal access to education for girls and
women, recognizing that investing in women's education is the key element in
achieving social equality, higher productivity and social returns in terms of health,
lower infant mortality and the reduced need for high fertility." Id. Empowering
women "requires . . . actions that will improve women's access to . . . educa-
tion . . . . In addition, improving one status of women also enhances their deci-
sion-making capacity at all levels . .. especially in the area of sexuality and re-
production." ICPD, supra note 6, ch. IV, 4.1.
154. See American Convention, supra note 43, art. 13(5), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 149.
The article, in the context of freedom of expression, provides that:
any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other
similar illegal action against any person or group of persons on any
grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national
origin shall be considered as an offense punishable by law.
Id. (emphasis added). Compare Article 20 of the ICCPR supra note 146 and ac-
companying text. The American Convention commits a further exclusion in provi-
sion prohibiting deportation or returning of an alien to a country "if in that coun-
try [her] right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of
[her] race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions." Id. art. 22(8),
1144 U.N.T.S. at 151 (emphasis added). This provision, on its face, permits such
deportation for violations based on sex.
155. The African Charter in dealing with freedom of movement, provides that
"[tihe mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be
that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic, or religious groups." African Char-
ter, supra note 44, art. 12(5), 21 I.L.M. at 62 (emphasis added). Again, gender is
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best, not as bad as other expulsions such as those based on
nationality, race, ethnicity or religion, and, at worst, acceptable
in the name of law. This is particularly distressing because
women and their children comprise 70-80% of the world's
refugees.'56 Significantly, refugee women as displaced persons
whose status disadvantages them, 57 are denied their human
rights and freedoms in the very sphere where they need the
most protection. 5
excluded when other classifications are explicitly listed.
156. The Beijing Platform noted that:
Women and children constitute some 80 per cent of the . . . [23] million
refugees and [of the 26 million internally] displaced persons in the world.
They are threatened by deprivation of property, goods and services and
deprivation of their [basic] right to return to their homes of origin as
well as by violence and insecurity. Particular attention should be paid to
sexual violence against uprooted women and girls employed as a method
of persecution in systematic campaigns of terror and intimidation and
forcing members of a particular ethnic, cultural or religious group to flee
their homes.
Beijing Platform, supra note 1, 137.
The United Nations recognizes that refugee women are in particular peril.
In July 1991, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
issued Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, paragraph 73 of which
specifically addresses "Country conditions affecting women":
Adjudicators [must] be familiar with the status and experiences of women
in the country from which a refugee claimant has fled. Among the issues
of which interviewers should be aware are:
* the political rights of women, including the right to vote, to hold office
and to belong to a political party;
* the social and economic rights of women, including the right to marry
the person of her choice, the right to an education, a career, a job or
remunerated activities, the status of a widow or divorcee, and freedom of
dress;
* the incidence of reported violence against women, the forms it takes
(such as sexual assaults, honour killings, bride burnings), protection
available to women and the sanctions or penalties on those who perpe-
trate the violence."
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES
ON THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEE WOMEN 73 (1991); see also Pamela Goldberg,
Where in the World is There Safety for Me?: Women Fleeing Gender-Based Persecu-
tion, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 345, 345 ("Of the estimated 18
million refugees worldwide, 80 percent are women and children.") (citations omit-
ted).
157. The ICPD recognizes that 'there is a need to strengthen the support for
international protection of and assistance to refugees, especially refugee women
and refugee children, who are particularly vulnerable. Displaced persons . . . are
also vulnerable and need international assistance." ICPD, supra note 6, ch. X(D).
158. The impact of war and other forms of political and economic hardship is
felt most severely by women. Goldberg, supra note 156. During wartime when men
are away fighting, women are left to carry the family burdens alone and women
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Finally, the Race Convention commits a similar though
more egregious faux pas: it excludes sex in making reference to
a provision of the Universal Declaration that includes sex.
159
This exclusion demonstrates that sex, meaning female, is so
inconsequential that it can be deleted even from where it ex-
ists.
These provisions that exclude sex as a basis of protection
of certain rights are particularly troubling in light of canons of
construction. Both common law and the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties mandate that when a general provision
and a specific provision conflict, the specific or detailed provi-
sion shall prevail.6 ' Using such rules of construction, the
drafters effectively excised sex-based protections from certain
substantive provisions in the instruments themselves, even if
the lofty preambular language included sex as a protected
are often expected to eat less or not at all during times of drought and food
shortages. Id. Women are often victims of rape and other forms of sexual assault,
as well as torture during war or oppressive regimes. Id. However, the hardships
do not end once the women have decided to flee; rather, they are especially vul-
nerable at this time because "traveling without men, women are subject to rape,
assault, robbery, harassment, and other cruel treatment. They may be separated
from their children. Money may be taken from them, and food denied them by
those 'assisting' them in their passage." Id. at 346.
159. The preamble to the Race Convention incorporates the principles of dignity
and equality of the U.N. Charter, the purpose of which is "to promote and encour-
age universal respect for an observance of human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" and pur-
portedly incorporating similar concepts from the Universal Declaration, it provides
for the entitlement of rights and freedoms "without distinction of any kind, in
particular as to race, color, or national origin . . . ." Race Convention, supra note
46, pmbl., 660 U.N.T.S. at 212-15. The omission of "sex" from thp Convention's
articulation of the purpose of the Declaration is particularly egregious as the Dec-
laration itself does provide that one of the grounds upon which distinctions shall
not be drawn is sex.
Further, similar to Article 20 of the ICCPR, see discussion supra note 147-
51 and accompanying text, and Article 13 of the American Convention, see discus-
sion supra note 154 and accompanying text, the Race Convention eliminates pro-
tection from sex-based offenses when it censures dissemination of ideas "based on
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts
of violence . . . against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic
origin. . . ." Id. art. 4(a), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220-21.
160. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (1990). A general rule of
interpretation provides "that parties who list specific items, without any more
general or inclusive term, intend to exclude unlisted items" a norm that is ex-
pressed in the "maxim expressio unios est exclusio alterius (the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another)." Id. at 515 (emphasis added); see also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 31, 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
340 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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classification. While in theory this can be attributed to, at best,
sloppy drafting, in the real world of rights advocacy it means a
loss of rights and perpetuation of subordination based on sex.
The realities of women's lives, as handicapped by an insen-
sitive legal framework, entrench the invisibility, silence, and
exclusion of women from the international fora at the rule-
making, rule-interpreting, and rule/rights-enforcing levels. This
exclusion imperils women's holistic well-being and denies full
personhood on the basis of sex. For instance:
o While the rules protect against discrimination based on
sex," 1 the reality is virtual starvation of the girl child"62
and female infanticide. 63
0 While the rules protect the right to life,'" the reality is
maternal mortality because of too-early, multiple, and closely
spaced pregnancies and a lack of health services during preg-
nancy and childbirth.'65
o While the rules prohibit genocide, 66 the reality is the
rape of women and girls for ethnic cleansing and/or as prizes
of war.'67
161. See, e.g., supra notes 34-35, 41, 45-47.
162. See supra notes 108, 145.
163. See supra note 145.
164. See Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 3 ("Everyone has the right to
life ... ."); ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 6(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174 ("Every human
being has the inherent right to life."); American Convention, supra note 43, art.
4(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 145 ("Every person has the right to have [her] life respect-
ed."); European Convention, supra note 6, art. 2(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 224
("Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law."); Cook, supra note 144 (for
expansion of notion of right to life from women's rights perspective).
165. See supra notes 12, 117, 124-26; IIernndez-Truyol, supra note 8, at 1393
(noting that maternal mortality claims 500,000 lives per year); Cook, supra note
144, at 256 (noting that "Im]any women die or are chronically disabled from preg-
nancy-related causes because of neglect of women's reproductive health") (citations
omitted); Herndndez, supra note 21, at 337-39; supra notes 12842 and accompa-
nying text (for statistics showing that denial of reproductive freedom imperils
fundamental right to health).
166. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 278 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
167. See supra note 104.
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0 While the rules prohibit torture,16 the reality sees brides
burned6 9 and others raped.
170
0 While the rules guarantee women's bodily integrity17 and
equality,'72 the reality sees women as wombs7 . and as
war booty.
74
The juxtaposition of rules and realities is ample evidence
of the limitation, implausibility, and inefficacy of the tradition-
al, unidimensional approach to achieving international protec-
tion of women's human rights and freedoms.'75 Women's ex-
clusion from the rights construct at all levels has meant loss
and denial of rights and the perpetuation of subordination of
women derived from and influenced by gender-based stereo-
types, customs, and tradition. Women's rights advocates must
work towards the adoption of a multidimensional,"6 multiple-
168. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 6,
art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174; African Charter, supra note 44, art. 5, 21 IL.M. at
60; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1985) (entered into force June 26, 1987).
169. See Mertus, supra note 5 (discussing dowry murders of Hindu wives in
India); supra note 118.
170. See supra note 112.
171. See, e.g., ICPD, supra note 6, 7.34 ("Equal relationships between men
and women in matters of sexual relations and reproduction, including full respect
for the physical integrity of the human body .... ").
172. See, e.g., Women's Convention, supra note 47, art. 2(c), 1249 U.N.T.S. at
16 ("States Parties . . . undertake . . . [tlo establish legal protection of the rights
of women on an equal basis with men . . . ."); see also supra notes 34, 36, 39-45.
173. See Hernndez-Truyol, supra note 8, at 1391 (commenting that ICPD rep-
resented focus of women in context of reproductive and sexual health rights and
freedoms, a shift from traditional focus on women as "wombs").
174. See Copelon, supra note 30.
175. See Cook, supra note 20 (discussing limitation of single-right based ap-
proach and proposing alternative approaches); see also Marfa Isabel Plata & Maria
Cristina Calder6n, Legal Services: Putting Rights Into Action-Profamilia-Colombia,
44 AM. U. L. REV. 1105 (1995) (discussing Colombia's Profamilia, successful pro-
gram promoting women's well-being); Sandra Coliver, The Right To Information
Necessary For Reproductive Health and Choice Under International Law, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 1279 (1995) (proposing novel approach to promote reproductive autonomy
and education); Monica Sharma, The Utility and Limits of Rights-Based Approach-
es: What Role Can Rights Play in the World of International Agencies?, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 1097 (1995) (discussing role international agencies can play by recognizing
existing paradigm and focusing on women's realities).
176. It is sensible to argue that such a multidimensional approach is envi-
sioned by the international human rights documents themselves as in the "classes
protected" clauses the classifications are not (as they should not be) made mutual-
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perspective human rights approach that recognizes rights af-
fecting women as indivisible from, and integral to, the existing
rights construct. The reconfigured model also must accommo-
date women's diverse experiences, including those informed by
race, ethnicity, nationality, culture, language, color, religion,
socio-economic class, and sexuality.
For example, one of the problems the world must face, in
light of the Bosnian, Haitian, and Rwandan tragedies, is that a
gender-based genocide construct does not exist.'77 This limit-
ed view of the rules renders women who have been repeatedly
and brutally raped, and those who have been forcibly impreg-
nated, invisible in the legal world. Rape in se is a horror, but it
is not recognized as such. 78 Rather, in order to condemn this
ly exclusive. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 2; Women's Con-
vention, supra note 47, pmbl.; ICCPR supra note 6, arts. 1, 2(1), 26, 999 U.N.T.S.
at 173, 179; Economic Covenant, supra note 40, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5; Afri-
can Charter, supra note 44, art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 60; American Convention, supra
note 43, art. 1, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 145; European Convention, supra note 6, art. 14,
213 U.N.T.S. at 232; ICPD, supra note 6, princ. 1; CDPOA, supra note 6, commit-
ments 4, 6, 91 45.
To be sure many scholars urge this approach. See l-erndndez-Truyol, supra
note 9 (discussing multidimensionality approach); Bunch, supra note 9, at 12
("Gender must always be analyzed in relation to other factors such as nationality,
race, and class in order to discern the multiple forms of human rights that women
suffer."). For a discussion on intersectionality, see Crenshaw, supra note 9; see also
Cook, supra note 20 (suggesting that broader rights construct would be more effec-
tive in making reproductive and sexual health rights and freedoms reality).
177. See Copelon, supra note 30, at 207 ("Emphasis on the gender dimension of
rape in war is critical not only to surfacing women as full subjects of sexual vio-
lence in war but also to recognizing the atrocity of rape in so-called times of
peace.").
178. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950) (entered into force Feb. 2, 1956 for the United States). This Con-
vention labels international crimes as "grave breaches," and only "grave breaches"
are "subject to universal jurisdiction under the Geneva Conventions, triggering the
obligation of every nation to bring the perpetrators to justice and justifying the
trial of said crimes before an international tribunal." See Copelon, supra note 30,
at 201. The Convention and Protocols have long proscribed rape and other sexual
violations, including forced prostitution, as war crimes. Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1978, arts. 75(2)(b),
76(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 37-38; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 4(2)(e), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 612.
Rapes, however, have not been among those crimes enumerated as "grave breach-
es." Rather, rape is characterized as a crime against the honor and dignity of
women, which is problematic in that it implies dishonor upon the victim and
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largely female-victim crime it must be placed in the largely
male construct of torture'79-the proverbial round peg in a
square hole. The prohibition against rape formally must be
articulated as a separate offense against the law of nations so
that there can be no question that it is a heinous and inhuman
crime whatever the context, be it global war or the neighbor-
hood bar.
Steps must be taken to remedy the existing gaps between
rules and realities. 8 ' Part VI proposes a model that considers
women's concerns at all stages: rule-making, rule-interpreting,
and rule/rights-enforcing. However, first it is important to
examine the role of culture in the existing rights construct.
V. THE ROLE OF CULTURE
Cultural views of gender have created, facilitated, and
perpetuated the schism between paper rights and the realities
of women's lives. Throughout time, a myth of equality has
permitted subordination of women at all levels of their exis-
tence under the guise of a benevolent and inclusive rule of
law."'1 Indeed, even in those rare instances when practices
eclipses the emphasis on the crime as one of raw violence. See YOUGINDRA
KHUSALINI, DIGNITY AND HONOUR OF WOMEN AS A BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL HU-
MAN RIGHT 39-76, 201 (1982).
However, recent developments in international law have recognized rape as
among the worst human rights violations. The Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, approved by the U.N. Security Council,
lists rape as a crime against humanity (art. 5(g)) and the prosecutor of the Tribu-
nal has charged rape as a "grave breach" (a form of torture and a violation of the
customs and laws of war) under the Geneva Convention. Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Resolution 880, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 49, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1173 (1993).
179. In its 1995 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights recognized the rape of women by the
illegal regime in Haiti and all other parties, whether public or private, as a form
of torture under article 5(2) of the American Convention. Report of the Situation of
Human Rights in Haiti, at 43, OEA/ser. L//II.88, doc. 10 rev. (1995).
180. As a leading scholar simply stated, "[tihe precondition to effective protec-
tion of rights is the authentication of abuses committed against women and the
recognition that they are legal wrongs." Cook, supra note 99, at 128.
181. As stated by John Stuart Mill:
Mhe principle which regulates the existing social relations between the
two sexes - the legal subordination of one sex to the other - is wrong in
itself, and now one of the chief hindrances of human improvement; and
that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting
no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.
Id. at 131 n.28 (citing JOHN STUART MLL, ON LIBERTY 119 (1869)).
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that effect the subordination of women are conceded to be
human rights violations, victims often have no relief.
The fundamental problem is that international law, like
other social institutions, has evolved as normative. This "norm"
is the well-entrenched perspective by which all is analyzed and
measured: a white, Western/Northern European, Judeo-Chris-
tian, heterosexual, propertied, educated, male ideology.
18 2
This concept of "normal" represents the group that historically
has controlled, and still controls, the power structure which
then "protects" or in some cases colonizes its subordinates by
conferring rights that exist only as this ruling class chooses to
define them."s
Governments endorse such a myopic perspective and, in
fact, accept and promote it as the rule of law. Certainly, only
in this framework can an ability such as childbearing be la-
beled a disability simply because the normatives cannot do it.
Is it a wonder then that the focus on women's rights, particu-
larly their bodily integrity and health rights in areas of sexual-
ity and reproduction, is a relative novelty?
One chilling example of the facilitating role of normativity
in the manipulation of women is government interference with
individuals' reproductive freedom to effect a state population
policy. This meddling wholly disregards that health, reproduc-
tive, and sexual rights and freedoms belong not to govern-
ments but to individuals.'84 It is individuals who should be
182. See Herndndez-Truyol, supra note 9. Feminist theory and critical race
theory, including a strand designated as critical race feminism, have critiqued the
normative model as flawed. See also Hilary Charlesworth, Human Rights as Men's
Rights, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 103, 103 (arguing that "cur-
rent international human rights structure itself and the substance of many norms
of human rights" actually hurt women because "law-making institutions of the
international legal order . . . [are] dominated by men . . . ."). For a discussion of
feminist theory and critical race theory, see infra note 201. For an annotated
critical race bibliography, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race
Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993). For a feminist
theory bibliography, see Paul M. George & Susan McGlamery, Women and Legal
Scholarship: A Bibliography, 77 IOWA L. REV. 87 (1991).
183. See Fathalla, supra note 21 (discussing impact of reproductive subordina-
tion on women's health); see also Sofia Gruskin, Negotiating The Relationship of
HIV/AIDS To Reproductive Health and Reproductive Rights, 44 All. U. L. REV.
1191 (1995) (discussing AIDS policies and their inherent sexism, racism and homo-
phobia).
184. See Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (Human
Rights Committee, under Optional Protocol to the ICCPR stated that "it is undis-
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able to exercise such rights in light of their particular circum-
stances which, of course, may include socio-economic, religious,
and cultural considerations, but are free from state en-
croachment upon, interference with, or regulation of such
rights and freedoms.'85 Nevertheless, world history is replete
with examples of governments' exploitation of women's fertility
to increase or decrease the population in order to meet per-
ceived state needs. " '
For example, although the then-Soviet Union decriminal-
ized abortion in the 1920s, the government reversed its policy
in the mid-1930s to compensate for the loss of population an-
ticipated in expectation of a World War. Yet, in 1955, in post-
Stalinist Russia, abortion again was decriminalized. Similarly,
the devastating effects of World War II on the population
prompted many Eastern European states to outlaw abortion in
the hopes of increasing population to re-establish the labor
force and rebuild armies.'87
puted that adult consensual sexual activity in private is covered by the concept of
'privacy'," and that the mere existence of law that criminalizes such conduct, even
if not enforced, "continuously and directly interferes with . . . privacy."); Norris v.
Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1988) (European Court of Human Rights
concluded that criminal laws proscribing consensual homosexual acts between
adults violated right of privacy under Article 8 of European Convention); Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 25 (1981) (court simply noted
that sexual life is part of private life and specifically held that under Article 8 of
European Convention, applicant had a "right to respect for his private life"); Case
2141 (Baby Boy Case), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, OEA/ser. L.IVJII.54, doc. 9 rev. 1
(1981) (holding that unborn do not have protectible right to life); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding woman's findamental right to reproductive freedom
grounded upon constitutional right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (recognizing that right to privacy exists in penumbra of Bill of Rights).
But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state law
criminalizing homosexual sodomy between consenting adults in privacy of home).
185. This is not to suggest that the state cannot regulate health, hygiene and
safety by setting standards for performance of medical procedures such as, for
example, natural childbirth or cesarean section deliveries. The state arguably has
such authority based on its obligation to protect the health and welfare of persons
within its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Economic Covenant, supra note 40, arts. 8-12, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6-8; Women's Convention, supra note 47, art. 12, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 19.
This, however, does not encompass state encroachment upon an individual's exer-
cise of her internationally protected rights to, among others, privacy and bodily
integrity. See supra notes 65, 74, 184.
186. See Fathalla, supra note 21, at 1182-83; see also Herndndez, supra note
21.
187. See Melissa A. Matteo, Note, Governmental Abortion Policies and the Right
to Privacy: The Rights of the Individual and the Rights of the Unborn, 11 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 103 (1985).
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Even Adolf Hitler, shortly after rising to power,
criminalized abortion and instituted an anti-abortion policy in
order to increase the population of the state, a policy that
resulted in many more abortionists being criminally
charged.18 Indeed, during World War II, German tribunals
could impose the death penalty for illegal abortions.'89 How-
ever, in Hitler's Germany, the charged abortionists could use
as a defense that the woman was Jewish-termination of a
Jewish fetus did not violate the proscription against abor-
tion.' More recently, the government of Germany has
sought to encourage births by offering payments of approxi-
mately $650 for each child.19'
Governments also have used abortion laws to reduce popu-
lation. For example, India and China, two countries with seri-
ous over-population problems, have instituted coercive abortion
policies as an integral part of the state's program to control
population growth.'92 Because these societies maintain a pref-
erence for boy children, reproductive technologies have been
used for sex selection purposes, although recently, both In-
dia193 and China.9 . have passed laws to prohibit this prac-
tice. State coercive reproduction policies, as well as the private
188. See Henry P. David et al., Abortion and Eugenics in Nazi Germany, 14
POPULATION & DEv. REV. 81, 89-101 (1988).
189. Id. at 81, 97.
190. Id. at 94.
191. See Stephen Kinzer, $650 a Baby: Germany to Pay to Stem Decline, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994, at A3.
192. See Herndndez, supra note 21, at 346 n.1. In 1990, the Census Leading
Group in China under the State Council, the State Family Planning Commission
and the Ministry of Public Security issued a circular on census and family plan-
ning providing that "it is wrong to give birth to any child beyond the state tar-
get . . . from now on, we still need to enforce the policy of family planning." 17
ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 6 (1993) (quoting Census Leading Group, Beijing Domes-
tic Service, Mar. 21, 1990, at 24-25). In India, many women who learn the sex of
the fetus during the first trimester opt or are forced to abort if the fetus is fe-
male. One study showed that 7,997 of 8,000 fetuses aborted were female while
another study showed that 40,000 female fetuses were aborted in 1984 in Bombay.
Jaising, supra note 108, at 51.
193. The Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Mis-
use) Act, Act No. 57 of Sept. 20, 1994.
194. Maternal and Infant Health Care Law (BBC summary of world broadcasts,
Nov. 3, 1994); see also Birth Law in China, HoUS. POST, Nov. 15, 1994, at A10
(noting that China will ban sex-screening of fetuses). Significantly, in a different
form of state-imposed population control that nevertheless also encroaches on indi-
vidual rights, it was also reported that China would forbid couples carrying seri-
ous genetic diseases from having children. Id.
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use of technology for sex-selection objectives, not only perpetu-
ate the subordination of women and the stereotype of "women
as wombs," but also severely affect women's well-being by,
among other things, infringing upon their exercise and enjoy-
ment of guaranteed international human rights. Thus, gov-
ernment regulation of fertility must be scrutinized and exposed
as a calculated attempt to control women's bodies in violation
of their individual human rights and freedoms.
In this context, serious consideration must be given to the
notion of cultural relativism.195 As will be discussed, culture
is, or can be, used both to perpetuate women's subordination in
the name of tradition, or to subordinate non-dominant cultures
in the name of law. Culture can be but a smoke screen to pre-
vent dealing with and recognizing historic oppression of women
and their subjection to the prevailing normative culture.196
Especially in an extreme case such as female genital muti-
lation (FGM), a practice recently condemned by the Committee
195. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Cultural Particularism as a Bar to Women's
Rights: Reflections on the Middle Eastern Experience, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 5, at 176. In providing a definition of cultural relativism, the author
states:
Cultural relativists argue that members of one society may not legiti-
mately condemn the practices of societies with different traditions, deny-
ing that there can be valid external critiques of culturally-based practices
and claiming that no legitimate cross-cultural standards for evaluating
the treatment of rights issues exist .... [Clultural relativists object to
universalist approaches on the grounds that they use criteria that are
ostensibly international but that actually reflect the values of Western
culture.
Id.
196. It is ironic that the term "universal rights" is being urged by some as a
means to limit rights by using the term as a modifier to signify only to those that
all cultures, religions and traditions accept. See, e.g., Beijing Platform, supra note
1, 1 2, 4, 8-9, 11-12, 14, 33, 113, 125(e), 132, 134, 149(b), 213, 223, 226 (use of
"universal" as a modifting/limiting term). This certainly is a flawed view approach,
particularly in the context of the development of human rights norms coming at
the heels of the genocidal tragedies of World War II. Indeed, universal rights are
precisely those from which no state may derogate, as they are fundamental to
personhood. Certainly, the individual must be free to consider, without state inter-
ference, her religious, cultural, and traditional norms and values in making deci-
sions and exercising control over her person. This was the view taken by the
Women's Linkage Caucus in its preparation for the Fourth World Conference on
Women in Beijing, China. See Women's Environment and Development Organiza-
tion, Women's Linkage Caucus Advocacy Chart 11 (July 1, 1995) (on file with
author) ("We strongly affirm language asserting that women's human rights are
universal and, at the same time, call for deleting the term 'universal,' when used
as a modifier to limit the universality of human rights.").
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on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) recommendations 97 and the Cairo Programme of
197. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), during its ninth session in 1990, issued General Recommendation No.
14 concerning the practice of FGM. That recommendation provides that CEDAW:
Concerned about the continuation of the practice of female circumcision
and other traditional practices harmful to the health of women,
Noting with satisfaction that Governments, where such practices exist,
national women's organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
bodies of the United Nations system, such as the World Health Organiza-
tion and the United Nations Children's Fund, as well as the Commission
on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, remain seized of the issue having par-
ticularly recognized that such traditional practices as female circumcision
have serious health and other consequences for women and children,
Noting with interest the study of the Special Rapporteur on Traditional
Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, as well as the
study of the Special Working Group on Traditional Practices,
Recognizing that women are taking important action themselves to iden-
tify and combat practices that are prejudicial to the health and well-be-
ing of women and children,
Convinced that the important action that is being taken by women and
by all interested groups need to be supported and encouraged by Govern-
ments,
Noting with grave concern that there are continuing cultural, traditional
and economic pressures which help to perpetuate harmful practices such
as female circumcision,
Recommends to State parties:
(a) That State parties take appropriate and effective measures with a
view to eradicating the practice of female circumcision. Such measures
could include:
(i)The collection and dissemination by universities, medical or nurs-
ing associations, national women's organizations or other bodies of
basic data about such traditional practices;
(ii)The support of women's organizations at the national and local
levels working for the elimination of female circumcision and other
practices harmful to women;
(iii)The encouragement of politicians, professionals, religious and
community leaders at all levels, including the media and the arts,
to cooperate in influencing attitudes toward the eradication of fe-
male circumcision;
(iv)The introduction of appropriate educational and training
programmes and seminars based on research findings about the
problems arising from female circumcision;
(b) That State parties include in their national health policies appropriate
strategies aimed at eradicating female circumcision in public health care.
Such strategies could include the special responsibility of health person-
nel, including traditional birth attendants, to explain the harmful effects
of female circumcision;
(c) That State parties invite assistance, information and advice from the
appropriate organizations of the United Nations system to support and
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Action, 9 ' a holistic women's well-being approach mandates
abolition of such a practice. 99 Otherwise, as far as controlling,
deleterious "health" effects of FGM, all that arguably would be
required for its legitimacy is an antiseptic setting, notwith-
standing its many long-term disadvantages to women, includ-
ing interfering with their health, safety, bodily integrity, and
sexuality. 200
assist efforts being deployed to eliminate harmful traditional practices;
(d) That State parties include in their reports to the Committee under
articles 10 and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women information about measures taken to elim-
inate female circumcision.
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Hu-
man Rights Treaty Bodies: General Recommendation No. 14 (Ninth Session, 1990),
at 79, 80, U.N. Doc. HI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994).
198. ICPD, supra note 6, 4.22 ("Governments dre urged to prohibit female
genital mutilation ... ").
199. Id.; see also Hern~ndez-Truyol, supra note 8:
Female Genital Mutilation
10. Cultural practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM) have
deleterious, long-lasting effects on women's reproductive and sexual health
which are or can be life-threatening. Governments, intergovernmental and
international organizations and NGO's must work together to eradicate
the practice of FGM and protect girls and women from such a practice
with such harmful effects on health. Resources must be invested to edu-
cate all persons about the detrimental effects of FGM, to focus on the
issue as part of the holistic reproductive and sexual health construct, and
to provide treatment and rehabilitative services to girls and women who
have experienced FGM.
Id. at 1411-12; Toubia, supra note 111, at 224 ("Female genital mutilation . .. is
an extreme example of efforts common to societies around the world to suppress
women's sexuality, ensure their subjugation, and control their reproductive func-
tions.").
200. This is not a theoretical platitude. See Anna Funder, De Minimis Non
Curat Lex: The Clitoris, Culture and the Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 417 (1993). Anna Fruder has noted that:
[hlealth, the objective discourse of medical science, has provided relief for
a symptom of a problem of culture and politics, not medicine. This is
commendable and will hopefully prove effective, but the problem of cul-
ture, and sensitive treatment or marginalization of issues affecting wom-
en, remains unaddressed. In Somalia's urban areas educated families
have their girls mutilated in hygienic modern hospitals.
Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
Female Genital Mutilation often results in death and:
[t]he lesser implications are infertility, Keloid formation (scars which
shrink the vagina) blockage of menstruation, painful intercourse (as
infibulated women must be cut open to permit insertion of the penis), ob-
structed childbirth, hemorrhaging, tetanus and septicemia from unsterile
instruments (kitchen knives, razor blades, pieces of glass), infection (an
infibulated child's excrement remains trapped in the bandages which bind
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The question of cultural relativism squarely presents a
challenge to the notion of the universality of human rights."1
Some cultural relativists would have the human rights struc-
ture itself be limited, rather than enriched, by culture. They
her legs together during the period of immobility which is required for
the skin between her legs to bind), bleeding of adjacent organs, and
shock and pain from the mutilation which is often carried out without
anesthesia.
Id. at 435-36.
Further, "psychological consequences can include frigidity and insatiability,
anxiety, melancholy and depression." Id. at 436. Variants of FGM, locations where
it is practiced, and health implications and justifications offered for it are dis-
cussed at id. at 434-37; see also Kirsty Magarcy & Elizabeth Evatt, Genital Muti-
lation: A Health and Human Rights Issue, Australian Development Studies Net-
work Briefing Paper No. 18 at 3 (1990); Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception,
World-Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surger-
ies, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 180, 189 (1992).
201. An in-depth treatment of the theories of relativism and universality are
beyond the purview of this article. Briefly, relativists hold that one society/group
cannot condemn traditions or practices of another because outsiders' critiques of
insiders' conduct is invalid, as there is no appropriate basis upon which to judge
others' conduct. Universalists, on the other hand, hold that all persons are entitled
to the same inalienable, fundamental human rights. Significantly, relativism and
universality are really inter-disciplinary, multi-layered concepts that incorporate
sociology, psychology, anthropology, philosophy and law. For an in-depth discussion
of these topics, see MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUB-
LIC ORDER xvii (1980) ("The conception of human rights which we recommend . . .
can be made to transcend all differences in the subjectivities and practices of peo-
ples, not merely across national-state lines, but as between the different arenas of
the larger community."); RENTELN, supra note 37 (for relativist perspective); Tes6n,
supra note 7 (for general critique of relativism and analysis of human rights docu-
ments which author argues does not support the relativist position); Donoho, supra
note 53 (for general discussion of relativism and universality). Donoho disagrees
with Tes6n, regarding human rights documents' lack of support for relativism,
positing that:
relativism, while largely incompatible with the founding principals of the
current international system, is nevertheless partially reflected in the na-
ture of states' international human rights obligations and in the interna-
tional system's limited international monitoring and interpretive capaci-
ty. . . . [And that] important practical reasons exist for tolerating some
relativity regarding the interpretation of human rights requirements.
Id. at 347; see also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach
to Defining International Standards of Human Rights, in CROSS-CULTURAL, supra
note 97, at 23, 24-25 ("Cultural relativism has been charged with neutralizing
moral judgment and thereby impairing action against injustice .... In my view,
the merits of a reasonable degree of cultural relativism are obvious, especially
when compared to claims of universalism that are in fact based on the claimant's
rigid and exclusive ethnocentricity."); Anna Funder, supra note 200. But see Detlev
F. Vagts & Douglas L. Donoho, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 416 (1991) (re-
viewing and critiquing ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM).
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would posit that treatment of an individual that comports to
local traditions is non-reviewable under universal human
rights norms because the tradition itself is the defining factor
of what is right and what is a right in a given locality.
This position is contrary to the lessons learned from slav-
ery, the Holocaust, and contemporary tragedies such as
Bosnia. Certainly, if governments could exterminate entire
groups of people in the name of culture, human rights would
be but a faded dream. A plethora of recent events have focused
attention on practices ranging greatly in their nature and
effects such as FGM,"' caning as a form of punishment,2 3
the imposition of the death penalty (especially on minors),"4
the wearing of a veil," 5 the cutting off of a hand for steal-
202. The increased number of immigrants from countries where FGM is prac-
ticed, such as the Sudan and Somalia, has brought FGM to the attention of the
United States. In October 1993, a bill was introduced in Congress by Patricia
Schroeder to ban the practice in the United States. The Female Genital Mutilation
Act of 1993, H.R. 3247, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (offered as amendment to ch.
7 of tit. 18 U.S.C.). The United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland have explicitly
banned FGM by statute, and Australia, Canada and France are applying existing
laws to prohibit it. See Mazy Ann James, Federal Prohibition of Female Genital
Mutilation: The Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1993, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J.
206, 208 n.3 (1994); See also Jill Smolowe, A Rite of Passage-or Mutilation, TIME,
Sept. 26, 1994, at 65.
203. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1994, supra note 103, at 680. The government of
Singapore applied the Vandalism Act to Michael Fay, an American teenager con-
victed of spray-painting private automobiles for which the punishment was impris-
onment and caning. Many critics questioned such a severe punishment for "youth-
ful, non-violent, first-time offenders." Id. Interestingly, women are exempt from
this form of punishment.
204. The Human Rights Committee, in its review of the United States' first
report on the implementation of the ICCPR (the first time ever United States'
human rights practices have been subject to review by an international body),
sharply criticized the United States for imposing the death penalty as a form of
punishment, and particularly to its maintaining the legality of executing minors.
One expert noted that the "[dieprivation of life was not a limitation but an abso-
lute act .... [And therefore] [1]imitations should not go beyond what was abso-
lutely necessary to protect a given societal value .... [She further asked wheth-
er] the United States plan[ned] to renew its position on the death penalty for
minors in light of those parameters." Human Rights Committee Begins Considering
Initial Report of United States, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1401st mtg., U.N.
Doc. HR/CT/400 (1995), available in >go-
pherd/gopher.undp.org-70/OO/uncurr/press_releases/HR/CT/95_03/405 (comments by
Cecilia Medina-Quiroga).
205. In 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran announced that the veil and
Islamic attire were mandatory for women. Mirhosseini, supra note 120, at 74.
Special camps were set up for women caught not in proper Islamic dress, and in
order to avoid abuse, the women would usually have to bribe the guards. Id. at
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ing, °' to name a few that some argue are wholly unaccept-
able as violative of human rights norms, but that others justify
in the name of culture, religion, and tradition."7 The
relativists' rejection of value judgments 0 -°ironicaly, a value
75. Further:
[c]lause number 102 of the Islamic Penal Code now provides that the
penalty for women who do not adhere to the dress code is between 34
and 74 lashes with a whip .... But, just as commonly, women who do
not adhere to the dress code are punished with acts of extreme cruelty:
their feet may be put in a gunny sack full of mice and cockroaches, their
faces splashed with acid or cut with razor blades.
Id. at 75.
In March of 1994, Algerian terrorist groups posted notices threatening to
kill any woman whose head was not covered by a scarf. Terrorists did in fact kill
a 17-year-old girl for not wearing proper attire. COUNTRY REPORTS 1994, supra
note 103, at 1052-53. Women in Saudi Arabia are required to wear the abaya, a
black garment covering the entire body including the head and face. Id. at 117.
See also Asma Mohamed Abdel Halim, Challenges to the Application of Internation-
al Women's Human Rights in the Sudan, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra
note 5, at 406, 407-410.
206. One of the categories of Islamic criminal offenses is sariqa, or theft, which
is punished by amputation of the thiefs right hand. An-Nan'im, supra note 201, at
33.
207. The use of religion to justify practices that many hold to be a human
rights violation, such as FGM, is not a new concept. See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
The Opening of The American Mind, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1989, § (Book Review),
at 1. Arthur Schlesinger explains that:
As a historian, I confess to a certain amusement when I hear the Judeo-
Christian tradition praised as the source of our concern for human rights.
In fact, the great religious ages were notable for their indifference to
human rights in the contemporary sense. They were notorious not only
for acquiescence in poverty, inequality, exploitation and oppression but for
enthusiastic justifications of slavery, persecution, abandonment of small
children, torture, genocide. Religion enshrined and vindicated hierarchy,
authority and inequality.
Id. at 26.
208. See RENTELN, supra note 37, at 13 (viewing cultural relativism as descrip-
tive, not value theory, and thus concluding that, as such "it does not entail toler-
ance or any other value . . . [r]ather, it is a theory about moral judgments
[and] . . . enculturation rather than tolerance proves to be the essential contribu-
tion of the theory . . . [so that] moral criticism is possible for the relativist"). Yet,
the author embraces what she labels ethical relativism which, in her words, holds
that "there can be no value judgments that are true, that is, objectively justifiable
independent of specific cultures." Id. at 71. Nonetheless, Renteln contends that
"human rights cannot be derived philosophically, but can only be established by
empirical demonstration." Id. at 12. However, Vagts & Donoho critique Rentein's
approach by stating that:
On the one hand, Renteln posits that moral values and judgments only
have objective validity or meaning in their specific cultural contexts. On
the other hand, since toleration and objectivity are not logically necessary
to this metaethical relativist viewpoint, external moral values may never-
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judgment in itself-is simply flawed. This article opposes such
a hands-off approach which, interestingly, tends to be most
vehemently employed when the rights of women are at stake,
such as the right to property ownership, integrity of the body,
self-determination, or enfranchisement. This skewed strand of
relativism appears to be simply pretextual-an excuse to keep
women under the proverbial thumb of patriarchy in the name
of culture, religion or tradition. Like racism, sexism in the
name of culture is no less sexism than sexism for sport."9
Why is it, we should ask ourselves, that when women are de-
prived of rights simply because of their sex, the justifications of
culture, religion or tradition are so readily acceptable and
defensible?
This article, of course, does not constitute, nor should it be
read or interpreted to constitute, a blanket rejection of culture,
religion or tradition. Rather, it advocates cultural pluralism as
an objective in any human rights discourse. Ethnocentric, cul-
turally-biased notions of right and wrong should be evaluated
in the context of appreciation for and recognition of other
world views. Personal decisions should be exercised by the
individual herself,210 not by institutional fiat, and the individ-
theless be used to criticize any culture's social practices. If, however, such
external judgments are not only possible, but valid in the sense that one
need not tolerate moral practices contrary to one's own, the relativist
insight is reduced to a seemingly empty acknowledgement that all moral
judgments, including international human rights critiques, ultimately
reflect a degree of ethnocentricity and enculturation.
Vagts & Donoho, supra note 201, at 416-18.
209. For example, certain laws provide that:
wi[ves] must obey [their] husband[s], that they are not allowed to work
outside the home without their husband's permission, that men may take
up to four wives, that Muslim women may not marry outside the faith,
and that women are entitled to only one-half the inheritance share that
men inherit in the same capacity . . . that women are compelled to wear
concealing garments in public, . . . that they are deprived of the right to
vote, that they are barred from the legal profession and the judiciary,
that their testimony in court is excluded or valued at one-half the weight
of a man's, that they are not allowed to travel without the permission of
a male relative or unless accompanied by a male relative, or that they
are not allowed to drive cars.
Mayer, supra note 195, at 177. These laws are no less an affront to women's
equality because they are in the name of culture and under the "rule of law" than
apartheid or slavery have been to racial equality which also had the imprimatur
of the "rule of law" and tradition. Id.
210. Finding that the right belongs to the individual, particularly when refer-
ring to women, does not ensure a paper right's translation into equality in fact.
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ual should be free to believe in, follow, or observe cultural,
religious or traditional practices or not.21' This, too, has its
limits, as no one would argue that torture or genocide should,
or could, ever be justified in the name of culture. Further, an
individual's right might well be illusory vis & vis societal and
familial pressures and expectations.212 Certainly social ostra-
cism, rejection or even punishment for failure to submit to a
practice might well negate, if not vitiate, the individual's free
will and exercise of her rights, including the right to self-deter-
mination.213
The individual needs to be informed of her right to reject certain practices, a
wholly illusory right if, for example, the practices are carried out on children who
do not have a legal or actual opportunity to consent. See, e.g., Toubia, supra note
111, at 233 ("There is, however, one very important difference between FGM and
the ways in which women alter their bodies in other cultures: FGM is mainly pre-
formed on children, with or without their consent.").
211. For a supporting view, see Rhoda E. Howard, Dignity, Community, and
Human Rights, in CROSS-CULTURAL, supra note 97, where Rhoda Howard states
that:
Human rights adhere to the human being by virtue of being human, and
for no other reason. Every human being ought to have human rights,
regardless of status or achievement.... Human rights are claims by the
individual against society and the state that, furthermore, 'trump' other
considerations .... This means that the human being who holds rights
holds them not only against the state, but also against 'society,' that is,
against his or her community or even family.
Id. at 82-83.
212. See Toubia supra note 111, at 233 (noting impact of pressure to conform
to tradition and submit to FGM regardless of fear of pain and stories of suffering
as "the desire to please parents, grandparents, and relatives by doing something
that is highly valued and approved of. . . there is the desire to be 'normal'-that
is, to be like other members of society, particularly the peer group"); see also
What's Culture Got to Do with It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female Cir-
cumcision, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1944 (1993) (noting that in some communities fe-
male circumcision is a prerequisite for women to be accepted as members of their
ethnic group). For an example of another type of "peer/group pressure" in our own
backyard, see Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (discussing whether non-
sectarian prayer at graduation ceremony of public school was impermissible es-
tablishment of religion under First Amendment by forcing student to stand and
remain silent during prayer).
213. See, for example, Kay Boulware-Miller, Female Circumcision: Challenges to
the Practice as a Human Rights Violation, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 155 (1985),
where Miller explains that consent to be circumcised is not a realistic notion be-
cause:
In addition to cultural pressures economic and social concerns may com-
pel women to "consent" to these operations [because] [i]n much of Africa,
marriage is a primary path to social and economic survival and advance-
ment [and] .[b]ecause uncircumcised women are not considered suitable for
marriage in some areas, many African women are forced to undergo
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International human rights theory supports the concept of
the universality of rights.214 Indeed, while human rights doc-
uments consistently address culture as a basis upon which
protections must be afforded,215 not one cites to culture as the
grounds upon which protected rights may be abridged.216
Rather, many of these documents support the conclusion that
some aspects of culture, particularly those justified solely by
status, particularly sex, must cede to universal human rights.
For example, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the African Child expressly balances rights and culture and re-
quires member states of the Organization of African Unity to
"abolish customs and practices harmful to the welfare, normal
growth and development of the child and in particular: (a)
those customs and practices prejudicial to the health or life of
the child, and (b) those customs and practices discriminatory to
the child on the grounds of sex or other status."17 Similarly,
the Women's Convention squarely confronts the possibility of
the misuse of culture as a pretext to discriminate and urges
states parties "[to take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against
women."21 Further, the Women's Convention requires that
circumcision to avoid becoming social and economic outcasts.
Id. at 157-58. The author offers that "[t]he use of the word 'consent' in this con.
text is problematic [because] [w]hile many women do agree to undergo this opera-
tion, overt or subtle pressures may cause them to feel that they have no effective
choice." Id. at 157 n.18.
214. For instruments supporting the universal nature of human rights, see
U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c); Universal Declaration, supra note 6, pmbl.; ICCPR, supra
note 6, pmbl., 999 U.N.T.S. at 172-73; DEVAW, supra note 5, pmbl.; Economic
Covenant, supra note 40, pmbl., 993 U.N.T.S. at 4-5; Race Convention, supra note
46, pmbl., 660 U.N.T.S. at 212; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
supra note 5, %% 1, 5, 18; ICPD, supra note 6, 9 26(j), 28-29, Commitment 5(i);
see also, Tes6n, supra note 7. But see Donoho, supra note 53.
215. See, e.g., Economic Covenant, supra note 40, art. 1(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5
("All people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their... cultural develop-
ment.").
216. However, the documents do refer to the protection of culture. See, e.g., id.
art. 1(1) ("By virtue of. . . [the right to self-determination all people may] ...
freely determine their . . .cultural development.").
217. Charter on the Rights of the Welfare of the African Child, July 11, 1990,
art. 21, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (emphasis added).
218. Women's Convention, supra note 47, art. 2(f), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16 (empha-
sis added). Significantly, distinctions on the basis of sex appears to occur even in
the ratification of documents. The Women's Convention has the somewhat dubious
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states parties "take all appropriate measures: (a) [t]o modify
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea
of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women .... ""
This rejection of cultural relativity is not intended to give
a sweeping endorsement to the concept of universality as it has
been applied under the present "normative" construct.Y As
one activist keenly observed, "one of the biggest problems with
universality as it has existed in the past is that [in] the pro-
distinction of having more reservations than any other human rights instrument,
many of these based on culture. For example, reservations were interposed by
Bangladesh, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia conditioning compliance on conformity with
the Shari'a. An interesting question arises as to whether these reservations can be
valid under international law which maintains that although reservations can be
taken, those that are contrary to the "object and purpose" of the treaty are not
valid. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 160, art. 19(c),
1155 U.N.T.S. at 337. Indeed, such reservations raise the question as to whether a
claim that sexual inequality is based on culturelreligionltradition can be valid in
light of a treaty whose basic purpose is to mandate sexual equality. For a discus-
sion of the debate over the legality of these reservations, the outcome being not to
review them, see Mayer, supra note 195, at 177-80.
Many non-Muslim states took reservations to the Convention as well. See
generally, Rebecca Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 687 (1990); Belinda
Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrim-
ination Against Women, 85 AMi. J. INT'L L. 281 (1991). The Women's Convention is
not the only instrument in which such anomalies occur. See ICPD, supra note 6;
CDPOA, supra note 6.
219. Women's Convention, supra note 47, art. 5(a), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17 (em-
phasis added). Moreover, Article 16 mandates that all:
1. States Parties . . . take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimi-
nation against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations and in particular . . . ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women: [rights that clearly are culture-related such as]
(a) The same right to enter into marriage;
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse ...
(e) The same right to decide freely and responsibly on the number
and spacing of their children ...
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife including the
right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation;
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership,
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition
of property.
Id. art. 16(1)(a)-(b), (e), (g), (h), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20.
220. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
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cess that led to universal articulation, a lot of people did not
participate."221 Hence, this article proposes an analytical
model that respects this critique. The issue in this perspective
of universality is not about colonizing by way of a Western
imposition of moral or ethical views. Rather, it exposes the
present construct as flawed for failure to consider perspectives
of insiders and outsiders. This problem is resolved in the pro-
posed model, in part, by ensuring that culture-meaning the
customs, practices and rituals of a particular group as well as
the ideas, beliefs, and values underlying them which define the
roles and status of the people in a given community and shape
their way of life-is included as part of the analysis in the
context of an amalgam of indivisible rights.
Indeed, this author rejects and eschews the normative
analytical construct that dichotomizes cultural relativism and
universality of rights without so much as a consideration of
possible alternative methodologies.2" In the model proposed
here, observations, findings, and judgments have to be fluid,
221. Statement of Mallika Dutt of the Center for Women's Global Leadership,
as cited by Dorothy Q. Thomas, Conclusion, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note
5, at 356, 357.
222. For another author who rejects narrow view of culture as only existing
juxtaposed with some other right, see Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Cul-
ture in International Human Rights Discourse, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 5, at 167, where Rao explains that:
When a government exempts itself from the perceived cultural hegemony
of human rights doctrine, its supporters as well as its detractors partici-
pate in perpetuating a false oppositional dichotomy in which geopolitical
borders are erased and a multitude of cultures are collapsed into two
falsely unified packages, one bearing the stamp of human rights and the
other lacking it.... I want to move away from these misleading con-
structions of culture to ask: What are the politics of any argument based
on culture in human rights discourse today? . . I question our easy
acceptance of cultural differences as they are presented to us, and criti-
cally assess four major components of any claim made from culture.
First, what is the status of the speaker? Second, in whose name is the
argument from culture advanced? Third, what is the degree of participa-
tion in culture formation of the social groups primarily affected by the
cultural practices in question? Fourth, what is culture, anyway?
Id. at 168; see also, Howard, supra note 211, where Howard explains that:
Awareness of the erroneous descriptive and analytic nature of simplistic
dichotomies such as traditional versus modern and African versus West-
em enables one to look more critically at the cultural relativity debate.
Scholars who use such dichotomies without perceiving their nuances and
internal inconsistencies frequently defend African culture as if it is
undifferentiable, unchangeable and nonpolitical in its impact.
Id. at 171-72.
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not carved in stone.2' Only such an approach can accommo-
date modern societies, diverse peoples, and the rule of law. As
science, religion, technology, communications, medicine, an-
thropology and, yes, even the law, grow and evolve, our way of
looking at tradition, social conditions, medical progress, techno-
logical changes, and the nature and status of rights also should
grow and evolve.
223. Charlotte Bunch, promoting a fluid notion of human rights, stated that:
The concept of human rights, like all vibrant visions, is not static or the
property of any one group; rather, its meaning expands as people
reconceive of their needs and hopes in relation to it. In this spirit, femi-
nists redefine human rights abuses to include the degradation and viola-
tion of women. The specific experiences of women must be added to tra-
ditional approaches to human rights in order to make women more visi-
ble and to transform the concept and practice of human rights in our
culture so that it takes better account of women's lives.
Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human
Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486, 486-87 (1990); Rao, supra note 222, at 173
("[C]ulture is a series of constantly contested and negotiated social practices whose
meanings are influenced by the power and status of their interpreters and partici-
pants [and it] is only one constituent art of the complex web of power relation-
ships that circumscribes our existence."); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Introduction,
in CROSS-CULTURAL, supra note 97, at 3, 4 ("Furthermore, since cultures are con-
stantly changing and evolving internally, as well as through interaction with other
cultures, it may be possible to influence the direction of that change and evolution
from outside through 'cross-cultural dialogue'."); see also Toubia, supra note 111,
for the cultural development of FGM, showing both that culture is fluid and that
the flow does not always follow the right (and rights) course:
Although FGM is a practice of culture (not religion), it is often strongly
associated with Islam .... But FGM is not a requirement of any reli-
gion: it is practiced by some Catholic groups (some Catholic missionaries
condoned it as a means of preserving women's purity) and many Coptic
Christians, as well as by Ethiopian Falasha Jews now living in Israel; it
is not practiced in many predominantly Islamic countries such as Saudi*
Arabia, Iraq, the Gulf States, Kuwait, Algeria and Pakistan. There is no
major Islamic citation that makes female genital mutilation a religious
requirement. Neither the Quran nor the "hadith" (collections of the say-
ings of the Prophet Mohammed) includes a direct call for FGM.
FGM was spread by dominant tribes and civilizations, often as a
result of tribal, ethnic, and cultural allegiances. For example, it was not
known in western Sudan among the Furs and the residents of the Nuba
mountains until the 1950s. After independence in 1956, local government,
education, and health services were introduced in the region by profes-
sionals from the educated middle classes of the north where FGM was
practiced. In the next twenty years, the cultural influences of the north-
ern elites prevailed. A survey conducted in 1979 reported that in Fur
and Nuba families, mothers were not circumcised but most daughters
were.
Id. at 230.
BROOK. J. INTL L.
The inviolability and indivisibility of human rights must
be the foundation for all analyses. It would be as absurd to
suggest that there is no difference between and among cultures
as it would be to suggest that genocide and torture are not
universal wrongs. Thus, human rights cannot and should not
be excised from or exorcised of culture. In this context, howev-
er, acts and practices that harm an individuals physical or
mental well-being unequivocally and irreversibly, even in the
name of culture, are simply wrong. Indeed, denial of equality
to women on cultural, religious and traditional grounds ap-
pears to create a "Catch 22" situation: if an obligation to elimi-
nate barriers to women's equality can be limited by the status
quo-such as culture, religion and/or tradition-and the status
quo has at its core entrenched and institutionalized inequality
on the basis of sex, then equality can never be achieved, being
shielded by the law that purports to mandate it.
This certainly is not to say or to suggest that there are no
cultural considerations or accommodations to be made when
dealing with human rights. 4 Quite the contrary, factors
such as race, nationality, ethnicity, etc., are integral to the
human rights construct. However, there is a distinction to be
made between considering or accommodating cultural customs
and using culture as a pretext to deny the integrity and digni-
ty of individuals on the basis of sex. These rights-to culture,
religion, tradition-are rights of the individual that govern-
ments should neither impose upon nor abridge in the name of
the law. In other words, international human rights scholars,
activists and representatives should neither use culture as a
224. See American Convention, supra note 43, art. 12, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 148
(freedom of religion); Id. art. 20, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 150 (right to nationality); Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 6, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232 (prohibiting discrimi-
nation based on "sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status"); See also Hernndez-Truyol, supra note 8:
Reconstruction of Rights
4. Articulated rights must be reviewed and reconstructed in light of
health, medical, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural reali-
ties so that the reconstructed rights framework develops, expands and
transforms the content and meaning of rights in a manner that is sensi-
tive to, effects, promotes and protects reproductive and sexual health
rights and freedoms.
Id. at 1410 (Recommendations).
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shield to protect practices that violate women's human rights,
nor use human rights norms as a sword, a weapon of subjuga-
tion, colonialism and moral imperialism, to oppress other com-
munities and ways of life.
VI. REFORM
This article proposes, and in this part develops, a theoret-
ical and analytical construct that effects much needed reform
in the international human rights arena to render women
visible and raise women's voices, all women's voices, so that
human rights can be women's rights too. In order to bridge the
gap between the rules and the realities, the proposal urges the
adoption of a theoretical construct2 that uses communica-
tion theory,226 legitimacy theory,22 ' and critical feminist/race
theory" as applied to international human rights law in a
225. The model uses the concepts of communication and legitimacy theories of
lawmaking, see infra notes 226-27, and critical feminist and race theories, see
supra note 228, and is being developed by the author in a work-in-progress.
226. The communication theory of law-making was developed by Professors
Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and W. Michael Reisman. See W. Michael
Reisman, International Lawmaking A Process of Communication, The Harold D.
Lasswell Memorial Lecture (Apr. 24, 1981); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael
Reisman, The Prescribing Function in the World Constitutive Process: How Interna-
tional Law is Made, 6 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 249 (1980); Myres S. McDougal
et. al., Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurispru-
dence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968); see also LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION
TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE (1989).
This model rejects the mainstream view of international lawmaking which
sets up a positive body of rules that govern relations between or among states as
well as between states and individuals. Rather, communication theory views inter-
national norm prescription as "a complex process of authoritative and controlling
decisions in which rules (and doctrines and principles) are continuously being fash-
ioned and refashioned by a wide variety of global actors to suit the needs of the
living . . . ." See Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A
Contextual Reassessment, 28 REV. D. MCGILL 542, 548 (1983).
227. See Franck, supra note 43.
228. Feminist theory is grounded on a critique of traditional lawmaking as
endemically inadequate because of its historic exclusion of women from the law-
making process. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in
the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29
(1987). Feminist theorists urge the incorporation of women's voices and the asking
the "woman question." See Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990). The historic legal perspective is deemed to be "male
[which] is systemic and hegemonic .... Feminism criticizes this male totality
without an account of our capacity to do so or imagine or realize a more whole
truth." Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 636-37 (1983); see also Martha Minow, The
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multidisciplinary, multidimensional context. The model re-
quires that the following three inquiries be made at each stage
of the rule-making process. First, the gender question: are
there any gender implications of the proposed lawmaking;
second, the women's question:229 a non-essentialist, multidi-
mensional evaluation of the impact of the lawmaking on wom-
en; third, the culture question: an analysis of the cultural im-
plications of the lawmaking.
Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10
(1987). Martha Minow opines that:
[wihat initially may seem to be an objective stance may appear partial
from another point of view. Furthermore, what initially appears to be a
fixed and objective difference may seem from another viewpoint like the
subordination or exclusion of some people by others. Regardless of which
perspective ultimately seems persuasive, the possibility of multiple view-
points challenges the assumption of objectivity and shows how claims to
knowledge bear the imprint of those making the claims ....
[ . . Unstitutional arrangements define whose reality is to be the
norm and make what is known as different seem natural.
Id. at 14. The feminist critique has been applied in the international context to
show how international law, like domestic law, is andro-centric and has
marginalized and ignored women, failed to meet their needs and accord them
equal status. See also Charlesworth, supra note 11.
Similar to the feminist critique, the critical race theorists challenge the
normative nature of law based on the distressingly "slow pace of racial reform in
the United States .... [The race critics concluded that] new approaches were
needed to understand and come to grips with the more subtle, but just as deeply
entrenched varieties of racism that characterize our times." Richard Delgado, Intro-
duction, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: TE CUTTING EDGE xiii (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995). A recent strand of critical race theory, called critical race feminism, writes
about intersectionality. For an example, see Brigitte Mabandla, Women in South
Africa and the Constitution-Making Process, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note
5, at 67 (discussing oppression of South African women stemming from intersection
of race, class, and gender); Crenshaw, supra note 9; Hernindez-Truyol, supra note
9; Harris, supra note 9; Margaret E. Montoya, Mdscaras, Trenzas y Grefias:
Un/Masking The Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1994); Adrien Katherine Wing & Sylke Merch6n, Rape,
Ethnicity and Culture: Spirit Injury From Bosnia to Black America, 25 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1993).
229. See Bartlett, supra note 228. The model proposed in this paper asks the
"women's question" as influenced by critical race theory, thus it is not simply a
pluralizing of Bartlett's "woman question" which infers a female counterpart to the
established male normativo. See infra note 232 for origin of term "normativo[/a."
Bartlett's woman question, as it evolved both domestically and internationally,
was, much like traditional rights theory, essentialist in that it excludes all but
those asking the question. On the other hand, the women's question, as a
multidimensionality inquiry, would include all women in a non-essentialist analy-
sis.
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The common thread of each inquiry, of course, is to make
women visible and raise their voices so that their needs are
met and their rights are respected. The basic tenet of the com-
munication theory incorporated into this methodology is the
recognition that communications are at the root of law-mak-
ingY. Although the ultimate lawmaking function may be rel-
egated to specialized institutions, these institutions as well as
the process of creating, interpreting, and enforcing the laws,
must include and integrate the views of those about whom the
law is concerned and for whom the law creates expectations as
to future behavior. 1 In this view, it is essential to focus on
raising women's voices and including women's perspectives
with a critical feminist/race conceptualization at all stages of
the formal and informal international prescriptive processes:
rule-making, rule-interpreting and rule/rights-enforcing. 2 To
achieve this end, it stands to reason that representation of
women, by women, is highly desirable, if not a legal and moral
imperative.
Similarly, the proposed model incorporates concepts from
Professor Franck's legitimacy theory which is based on the
premise that the legitimacy of a government is dependent upon
having the consent of the governed and respect for the opinion
of the people. 3 In this regard, the government, to be legiti-
mate, must ascertain the opinions and desires of the people,
including women, by asking the articulated questions at each
stage of the lawmaking process. Once prescribed, a government
must follow the rule of law, an integral part of which is provid-
ing for and securing individual rights.
Moreover, the critical feminist/race dimension (like the
communications and legitimacy theories) would also require
women's participation. Only with women's presence and per-
spectives in the process of government and governing, will
women's concerns and issues become an integral part of, and
incorporated into, the global agenda. It is significant that the
failure to ask the pertinent questions concerning gender, wom-
en, and culture is largely due to the exclusion of women from
the global communication process which makes, interprets, and
230. See supra note 226.
231. See supra note 226.
232. See supra note 226.
233. See Franck, Emerging Right, supra note 43.
1996] 669
BROOK. J. INTL L.
enforces international legal norms. Without women in the roles
of commissioners, rapporteurs, committee members, commis-
sion members, U.N. and international agency representatives,
activists, citizens, and scholars, women's thoughts and feelings,
rights, needs, realities, and perspectives will not be expressed
or addressed. Without women's input, the normatives" 4 will
retain a monopoly on, and power over, false-truth images.
Inquiry 1: The Gender Question - Are there any gender
implications of the rules or practices that otherwise appear
neutral or objective? In human rights considerations, this ques-
tion will ascertain whether (and which) women's rights are
involved. Women must be among the inquirers as well as the
inquired.
Inquiry 2: The Women's Question - What will the implica-
tions of the rule or practice, as interpreted and enforced, be on
the real lives of women, and how will women be disadvan-
taged? 5 It is imperative to conduct this inquiry in a non-
essentialist manner with a multidimensional, holistic perspec-
tive. In order to avoid, and institutionally eschew essentialism,
the methodology requires the inquiry to address the conflation
of gender and other aspects of a woman's personhood, such as
race, ethnicity, class, ability, and sexual orientation, both to
evidence and to account for the indivisibility of rights. The
methodology also must ensure that any identified causal links
between gender and a particular outcome are accurate and
relevant to the issue being consideredY6
To be sure, such articulation of the women's question is
over-simplified. In its proper application, it must take into
account the multiplicity of coexisting factors and issues-the
multidimensionality of women's lives. Thus, the inquiries need
to be taken factor by factor, issue by issue, not simply creating
dichotomies, but permitting consideration of combinations,
permutations, and implications of rules and practices for wom-
en, who by their status constitute anywhere from one to mani-
fold "deviations" from the normY 7 Thus, the proposed
234. See Richard Delgado, Moves, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1071-75 (1991)
(Professor Richard Delgado coins the term "normativo[/a].").
235. See Cook, supra note 20, at 975, 986-87 (discussing the "woman question"
in context of reproductive rights).
236. See Freedman & Maine, supra note 25, at 1089-92 (noting that maternal
mortality effect of FGM is often cited as being factually unproven).
237. Of course, this term is not used in its formal statistical sense, rather it is
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women's questions, effectively a series of communications in
which women participate in the process of governance both as
inquirers and as the inquired, will better facilitate a proper
landscape for making a reality of women's paper rights."5
Recent events are evidence that women have slowly but
surely started this process. In Vienna, the 'Women's Issues"
NGOs were recognized as the most effective of all groups, both
official and unofficial, attending the conference. They made
women's voices heard and women's realities visible, effecting
the establishment of women's rights as an official part of the
human rights agenda.239  The same is true for the
used to measure the degree of an individual's difference from the so-called "norm".
See supra note 182 and accompanying text; see also Herndndez-Truyol, supra note
9.
238. For example, at the domestic and international levels, women lack repre-
sentation in official governmental structures as well as in private sphere organiza-
tions involved in the international arena. One of the critical differences today is
the growing number of NGO's whose concerns are women's rights. These NGO's
must be heard. They must speak loudly and clearly about women's issues and
insist that the women's questions be asked. However, the process of inquiry cannot
step at NGO membership, but must address those who will be affected, their pur-
ported constituency - the real life women in the trenches and on the front line.
In looking at the constituency, the central question then becomes "when
human rights deprivations occur, can victims or others bring complaints to appro-
priate transnational decision makers for remedy?" In my view, this is a critical
place to ask the women's question. To be sure, various covenants provide for the
right of individual petition. However, as we all know, this is far removed and
remote from many women. We need to extend the concept of invocation to include
local groups and grassroots organizations that not only process the complaints, but
also are equipped to take action at the appropriate levels, with the support and
assistance of the transnational decision makers, to provide real (and not just theo-
retical) remedies. The historic concept of complaint must thus be expanded so that
all women's voices can be heard. This is particularly true in seeking redress for
so-called culturally justified practices.
The outcome sought by international human rights law is the enjoyment of
articulated rights. Thus, it is important to challenge unlawful deprivations; it is
imperative that basic community policies be applied to control practices and that a
continuing consensus is mobilized in support of prescriptions toward the greater
future protection and fulfillment of women's human rights. Human rights must be
transplanted from an institutional transnational context to a global network of
local, regional, national, and international organizations that focus on women and
their concerns. In so doing, as with the invocation, the application must consis-
tently ask the women's question.
239. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 5. For exam-
ples of the recognition of women's rights, see id. sec. 11, % 38 (noting that viola-
tions of women's human rights during wartime violate basic principles of interna-
tional human rights law and calling for an end to violence against women in pub-
lic and private spheres); Id. sec. II 39 (urging universal ratification of Women's
Convention).
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ICPD-women again organized, galvanized, and were
heard.24 Such efforts to present and evaluate women's issues
from a multidimensionality and interdisciplinary perspective
require an analysis of cultural relativity.
Inquiry 3: The Culture Question - What are the cultural
considerations driving the practices and rules? To evaluate any
perceived or claimed cultural conflict between a practice and a
universal human right, the model proposes applying a balanc-
ing test which includes aspects of the communication, legitima-
cy and critical feminist/race theories. First, one must obtain
information about the cultural practice from both an "insider's"
and an "outsider's" perspective, the insider being the proponent
or practitioner of the cultural practice; the outsider being the
normativo/a asserting the conflict. In addition, in light of the
challenged practice, the human rights norm must also be ex-
amined from both an insider and an outsider perspective, the
insider here being the proponent of the human rights principle
and critic of the culture.
In this context, particular attention to cultural practices is
necessary so that they may be carefully protected from the
improper imposition of outsiders' ideologies. However, culture
must not be used as a smoke screen to prevent recognizing and
dealing with the historic oppression of women and their uni-
versal, cross-cultural subordination. In examining a cultural
practice that appears to disadvantage only women, or have a
disproportionately burdensome impact on women, the cost of
violating the human rights norm must be weighed against the
benefit of the cultural practice. One should commence by ask-
ing at least these questions: What is the origin and value of
the cultural practice?; What is its level of significance to the
culture and within the community?; What is its level of intru-
sion on a protected individual right?; and How significant is
the human rights norm to the international community? The
inquiry must be further contextualized by addressing the fol-
lowing: the nature of the practice being challenged, who is
challenging the practice (i.e., an insider241 versus an outsid-
240. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action notes that one of its
main objectives is "gender equity and equality." See ICPD, supra note 6, pmbl., 9i
1.12.
241. For example, is it a woman who does not want to follow her culture's or
country's dress code, such as wearing a veil? Is it a woman who does not want to
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er2"), the challengers' motives for opposing the practice, and
the claimed harmful outcomes of the practice.243
In this regard, we must recognize that a broad range of
practices exists. At one end of the spectrum are rituals such as
ear-piercing female infants, a practice that arguably has, no
detrimental lifelong effect on women's human rights and free-
doms, including health. At the other end of the spectrum are
practices such as FGM, female infanticide, and reproductive
controls, such as forced pregnancies or forced abortions-both
equally troubling,244 all of which have dramatic and harmful
life-long effects on women's reproductive and sexual health
rights and freedoms both in se and as indivisible parts of a
plethora of rights critical to women's existence, well-being and
full personhood, including life, health, privacy, family life, eco-
nomic self-determination, political participation, education, and
equality.
Significantly, it is imperative that for any analysis of cul-
tural practices to be valid, it must be conducted from the per-
spective of both "insiders" and "outsiders." For example, indus-
trial state feminists need to think seriously about how certain
practices could be explained to others. Consider, for example,
the glass ceiling phenomenon,245 the feminization of pover-
ty,246 the denial to mothers of welfare benefits if they have
more children than a state thinks they should, while fathers
(many of whom do not support the mothers or the children) are
not part of the "welfare reform" equation.247 Of course, there
are extremes, such as FGM,24 where the age at the time of
the procedure is, or could or should be, a critical issue. 9
submit to a traditional practice, such as FGM?
242. For example, does the dispute concern a blanket Western challenge to a
non-Western dress code, such as wearing a veil, or a non-Western practice, such
as caning for punishment?
243. For example, is a woman's life and/or well-being threatened because she
refuses to submit to a traditional practice or follow a dress code, or because she
wants to drive or travel alone?
244. See Fathalla, supra note 21; see also Herndndez, supra note 21.
245. See supra note 27 for discussion of glass ceiling phenomenon.
246. See BECKER, supra note 19.
247. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, § 82-1.11 (1995) (New Jersey's child
exclusion law).
248. See supra note 111.
249. The age of girls when "circumcised" varies widely. In some cultures, it is
done at infancy, while in others the girl is 16 years old, of marriageable age. The
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This raises the interesting question of whether analysis of the
practice could or should depend on whether the genital surgery
was delayed until an appropriate age of consent. Would "con-
sent" make the practice an elected procedure and thus not a
violation of the rights to bodily integrity? In such cases, the
answer would have to include considerations of individual free
will and self-determination Is the problem solved by, as
some recently have suggested, performing the procedure in an
antiseptic hospital setting?"' What about other elected cos-
metic surgeries that carry serious physical and mental health
risks, such as breast augmentation? 2 Even if none of these
practices is acceptable, the methodological question remains:
how does the human rights community inform a group that
certain practices violate human rights norms. For example,
what is the appropriate way to inform certain communities, for
example American Indians that domestic violence is unaccept-
able conduct and not private business as usual. 3
It is clear that there are no easy answers to the cultural
inquiry. However, there are questions that can be raised and
examined to start the process of communication that will even-
tually, and hopefully, lead to a multidimensional and cultural-
ly sensitive perspective. This proposed process represents a
major leap forward in ensuring the protection of women's hu-
man rights.
most common age, however, is between four and six-years-old. Toubia, supra note
111, at 226. FGM is practiced in "at least twenty-six African countries, among a
few groups in Asia, and (increasingly) among immigrant populations in North and
South America, Australia, and Europe." Id. at 224.
250. See supra note 85 (discussing right to self-determination).
251. Barbara Crossette, Cairo Visitors Hear Plea to End Genital Maiming, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, at A10.
252. See Gunning, supra note 200; see also Peters & Wolper, supra note 104,
at 6 (While [FGM] is generally considered primarily an African problem, "cultural
norms of sexual desirability in other regions . . . encourage women to mutilate
their bodies through poisonous breast implants and other kinds of dangerous plas-
tic surgery."). Nahid Toubia expands on this notion explaining that women whose
cultures practice FGM sometimes take exception to criticism levelled at them when
Western women undergo "feminization rites" of their own, such as cosmetic sur-
gery and high heels. Toubia, supra note 111, at 232-33.
253. See Gloria Valencia-Weber & Christine Zuni, Domestic Violence and Tribal
Protection of Indigenous Women in the United States, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. (forth-
coming 1996) (discussing domestic violence among various Native American Indian
nations).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The proposed methodology, with its expansive and exten-
sive role for women, will better facilitate an inclusive global
setting for addressing women's issues, resolving women's prob-
lems, and effecting women's greater participation in a process
that is central to their dignity and status as women and as
human beings. In this context, the role and propriety of gov-
ernment regulation must be scrutinized as part of the overall
inquiry. Take for example reproductive freedom controls. Os-
tensibly, such controls are intended to protect a nascent form
of life, 4 or some other allegedly appropriate government
interest. 5 A look at the history of reproductive freedom reg-
254. For example, the House Judiciary Committee recently sent a bill to the
House floor which would criminalize what is referred to as "partial-birth" abortions
by anti-abortion groups, and "intact D and E" (for dilation and evacuation) by pro-
choice groups. Under this procedure "the person performing the abortion partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the deliv-
ery.'" Diary: Yesterday in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1995, at A16 (descrip-
tion provided by congressional opponents of abortion); see Tamar Lewin, Method to
End 20-Week Pregnancies Stirs a Corner of the Abortion Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July
5, 1995, at A10 (anti-abortionists describe the process as suctioning out the fetus's
brain to make the head fit more easily through the birth canal). Opponents of the
bill voiced concern that it would erode the rights established by Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). Diary: Yesterday in Washington, supra, at A16. In this still hotly-
debated case, the Court held that "for the stage subsequent to viability the state,
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regu-
late, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." Roe, 410 U.S.
at 114; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (rejecting
trimester framework of Roe and holding that women may abort fetus before "via-
bility"); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 141 CONG. REc.
H15990-06, 116000 (1995) (commenting on legislation to ban abortions on military
bases).
255. Notwithstanding the fundamental nature of the individual right to choose
whether or not to bear a child, see, for example, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (right to reproductive freedom grounded in constitutional right to privacy),
the fiscal access necessary to the exercise of that right appears to have been dis-
connected. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that an amendment
denying public funding for certain medically necessary abortions "places no govern-
ment obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy").
The Court reasoned that although indigency would be an obstacle for some who
had a medical necessity for an abortion, "Et]he financial constraints that restrict an
indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected free-
dom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abor-
tions, but rather of her indigency." Id. at 316. The Court concluded that the
amendment did not abridge the constitutionally protected freedom of choice recog-
nized in Roe v. Wade. Id. at 317; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servic-
es, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). The Court, in Webster, noted that "[hlaving held that the
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ulations, however, spins a different tale of manipulation of
women's bodies for improper purposes. 6
One of the critical differences in the human rights world
today is the growing number of NGOs whose focus and con-
cerns are women's rights. These NGOs have spoken loudly and
clearly on women's issues, insisting that women be included in
the process and successfully planting women firmly in the
international rights landscape. This process was successfully
started in Vienna and has continued in the ICPD, at the Social
Summit, and in Beijing, despite large obstacles. 7 However,
women's initiatives must not stop at NGO membership, but
must reach all women-in their everyday lives, of having ba-
bies, working for no pay, making less money than men even
when they are paid, and suffering personal abuse to their bod-
ies and dignity simply because of their sex.
In looking at this constituency, a central concern is wheth-
er "when human rights deprivations occur, can victims or oth-
ers bring complaints to appropriate transnational decision
makers for remedy?"' 5 To be sure, various international cov-
enants and declarations provide for the right of individual
petition. However, this process is far removed and remote from
many women's realities. The implementation of women's hu-
man rights must extend beyond paper to involve local groups
and grassroots organizations in not only the process of taking
complaints but in taking appropriate action as well (with the
support and assistance of transnational legal institutions) in
order to provide real, rather than theoretical, remedies. This is
particularly true in seeking redress for so-called culturally
justified practices, about which local groups are the most in-
formed and aware. The formalistic concepts of complaints must
be expanded to include more informal structures to ensure that
state's refusal to fund abortions does not violate Roe v. Wade, it strains logic to
reach a contrary result for the use of public facilities and employees." Id. at 509-
10. Thus, a statute's ban on the use of public employees and facilities for the per-
formance of nontherapeutic abortions was constitutional. Id. at 510-11. It becomes
an interesting question then, whether a fundamental right without access to a
remedy is a right at all or instead a claim "full of sound and fury, signifying
nothing." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 5, sc. 5.
256. See supra notes 184-94 and accompanying text (for discussion of fertility
controls).
257. See China: Tibet Groups Banned from Conference, LA. TIMES, July 22,
1995, at A7.
258. See Zulficar, supra note 11, at 1020.
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women are visible and their voices heard. These changes are at
the heart of the proposed reform.
The outcome sought from this process is the enjoyment by
women of their human rights. This requires the development,
expansion, and transformation of the content and meaning of
articulated human rights norms so that they include, and ap-
ply to, the reality of women's lives. It is important to challenge
unlawful deprivations; it is imperative to mobilize a continuing,
consensus; it is vital that the rules are interpreted and en-
forced for the protection and fulfillment of women's human
rights. The methodology urged in this article seeks to facilitate
the creation and the realization of a holistic, non-essentialist,
multidimensional construct in which women are not, and in-
deed cannot be, marginalized or subordinated. It focuses on the
inclusion of all women in a system that defines and defends
women's rights as human rights, and thus protects and pro-
motes the well-being, integrity, and international human
rights and freedoms of women worldwide.
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